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Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement
Over Extradition, Jurisdiction, The Role
of Human Rights, and Issues of
Extraterritoriality Under International
Criminal Law
ChristopherL. Blakesley*
Otto Lagodny**
ABSTRACT

This Article examines extradition andjurisdiction over extraterritorial
crime, focusing on the relationship between jurisdiction and extradition
in the broadercontext of human rights law. The authors challenge what
they argue are chimerical, although strongly held beliefs in the incompatibility of European and United States criminaljustice systems and extradition practices. They argue that cooperation in matters of international
criminal law may be enhanced, while protection of human rights is promoted. The authors establish this possibility by breaking down the barriers to understandingthat stem from the divergent European versus Anglo-American modes of analysis.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; J.S.D., Columbia University; LL.M, Columbia University; M.A., Fletcher School of International Law and

Diplomacy, Tufts University; J.D., University of Utah; B.A., University of Utah. Professor Blakesley is a former Attorney Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, the United

States Department of State.
** Dr. Jur., Tiibingen University. Professor Lagodny is Head of the Branch of Crim-

inal Law at the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law,
Freiburg i. Breisgau, Germany.
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The authorsfirst analyze the five traditional bases of prescriptivejurisdiction in the United States. Next, these principles are compared to
their counterparts in French and German law. The authors then focus
their discussion on the German principle of ubiquity and its United
States parallel,which is a combination of both the objective territoriality
theory (the effects doctrine) and the subjective territorialitytheory, which
arises when an element of the crime occurs in the United States. The
objective and subjective territorialitytheories have expanded to mitigate
conflicts resultingfrom a traditional strict application of territoriality
principles.
Next, the authors discuss the question of whatjurisdictionalprinciples
allow extradition when an offense has no specific territorial basis. The
protective principle, the passive personality principle, the nationality
principle, and the universality principle are analyzed in this context.
The authors compare United States application of these principles to that
of European states and suggest that the differences are less than usually
is purported. The authors also examine the special use of double criminality in extradition cases, which requires simultaneous jurisdiction in
two statesfor an individual to be extraditable. They question its viability
in each system. The authors next suggest that the United States Government ought to consider the applicationof vicarious administrationofjustice, which is common in European states.
The authors then apply these principles to mutual assistance in criminal matters, especially extradition, and discuss two possible situations:
first, when only one state proscribes the conduct in question; second,
when two or more states proscribe the conduct and one state enlarges the
proscription. Theoretical principles,policy perspectives, and contrasting
modes of analysis are compared in the context of extradition and mutual
assistance. Theoretical problems are indicated and solutions are proposed. The authors conclude that if a strict doctrine of territorialitywere
the only basis of extraterritorialjurisdiction, then competing jurisdiction
would not be a problem although a strict territorial approach would
make both the domestic and the internal systems dysfunctional. The recognition and application of active and passive personality principles,
along with the protective and universalityprinciples are needed to make
criminal law viable in the modern world. Their application, however,
causes problems in matters ofjurisdiction and cooperation. The authors
propose several new ideas to resolve the jurisdictional and substantive
problems, including the application of vicarious administrationofjustice
when extradition is not possible.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article is an application of international and comparative law. It
is an attempt to combine understanding and perceptions of international
and domestic criminal law developed in the European and United States
legal cultures. It is an attempt to break down barriers to understanding
and cooperation in the arena of international criminal law. The authors
challenge some of the staid perceptions of disagreement in matters of
international criminal law and cooperation, which have maintained a
sense of basic incompatibility of certain significant aspects of the theory
and practice of international cooperation in criminal matters and the
protection of human rights. By developing an understanding of each
other's basic premises and analytical style, cooperation in this arena may
be enhanced, while the protection of human rights is promoted. The authors contend that this study shows that international and comparative
law are connected inextricably. Thus, if international law scholars and
practitioners are going to understand each other and break down barriers
to cooperation, each is going to have to understand the other's basic
premises and methods of analysis. The authors attempt to apply their
comparativistic understanding and techniques to certain heretofore believed important and seemingly insurmountable barriers to understanding and cooperation in the realms of international extradition and
cooperation.
This Article considers certain aspects of extradition and jurisdiction
over extraterritorial crime and focuses on two misunderstandings that
are so fundamental that they take on the character of substantial disagreements. The first misunderstanding is that jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime in United States law exists not as a basic principle in its
own right, but only as an exception to the substantive principle that jurisdiction contemplates territorial jurisdiction. The second misunderstanding is that human rights only restrict interstate activity in the field
of extradition. The first part of this Article analyzes substantive' juris1. Whereas in the United States there has been a tendency to proceduralize substantive rights, in Europe, especially Germany, there is a very important distinction between
substantive and procedural law that borrows from Roman traditions. Substantive law
concerns the contents of rights and duties of the state as the public power or of the
individual. Procedural law, however, regulates the manner in which these rights can be
realized by means of judicial decisions. See, e.g., H. KAUFMANN, STRAFANSPRUCH,
STRAFKLAGERECHT 9 (1968). In the United States, the distinction in principle is similar,
but in fact there is more blurring of the line between substance and procedure. In international law as well as the domestic law of all states, it is not clear whether the rules
relating to extraterritorial application of criminal law are in the procedural or the substantive category. Some commentators argue that they occupy a category that has a logi-
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diction to prescribe in conjunction with the reach of substantive criminal
law in the United States. The Article establishes that many of the perceived drastic differences between the law of the United States and that
of other states are largely chimerical. The Article then focuses on the
interrelationship between jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime and extradition with regard to the reformative and limiting function of human
rights law and the corresponding impact on existing legal institutions.
The Article further analyzes the interrelationship between mutual assistance in criminal matters with an emphasis on extradition.
II.

JURISDICTION, EXTRADITION, AND COOPERATION

Law is the language by which nations assert their interests and attempt to resolve problems created by confrontation with competing legal
interests.' Communication problems, however, are significant. 3 This Article is designed to counterbalance United States and European law and
language to provide better understanding that results in better relations
in the realm of international criminal law. Some United States governmental functionaries have suggested that some of the propositions
presented and discussed in this Article are interesting, but too theoretical
and impractical to merit application.4 On the other hand, some Europeans contend that the United States "practical" approach is short-sighted
and lacks depth.5 Additional commentators argue that Anglo-American

cal priority to both substantive and procedural law. See, e.g., H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS 145 (4th ed. 1988). For purposes of this Article, these rules will be
treated as substantive law.
2.

See C. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND THE PROTECTION OF
LAW ch. 3 (1991); Blakesley, A Conceptual

HUMAN LIBERTY IN INTERNATIONAL

Frameworkfor Extradition andJurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialCrimes, 1984 UTAH
L. REV. 685.
3. See Eser, Common Goals and Different Ways in International Criminal Law:
Reflections From a European Perspective, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 117, 118-21, 125-27
(1990). In reference to the Harvard Conference on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, Professor Eser noted that "it was clear that the organizers and participants
from the two sides of the Atlantic were habituated to quite different ways of thinking."
Id. at 118.
4. Author's notes, Harvard Conference on International Cooperation in Criminal
Matters; see generally 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1990) (reporting the proceedings of this
conference).
5. Recently, ample evidence of the weakness was manifest in a Conference on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters. See 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1990). A United
States participant, for example, remarked that the "rule of reasonableness" should replace principles of jurisdiction as if imposition of a United States term of art would
work. The European's reply that the "rule of reasonableness" must be based on a set of
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theory is practical, but unsystematic, and casuistic, while European theory tends to analyze and solve legal problems with a theoretical, abstract,
doctrinaire, and conceptualistic bent.' These differences sometimes make
it difficult for either side to appreciate what the other is attempting to set
forth.
This Article is an attempt by the authors to overcome these deficiencies and to combine insight. German writers in the Pandectist tradition'
provide a significant practical and functional model for refined conceptual legal reasoning and problem solving from which Anglo-American
legal thinkers could profit. Similarly, Germans need to unravel the
United States proceduralistic language and result-oriented approach to
legal problem solving in order to build a broader base of understanding
and cooperation. Thus, combining analytical methodology would be beneficial to all parties.
Theory and practice are inextricable. Misunderstanding this concept
of inextricability renders a practitioner ineffectual, if not dysfunctional.
To understand the practical function of the law, one must understand
conceptual and theoretical bases. Ad hoc casuistry ultimately is impractical and self-defeating, especially in the international arena where diverse
cultural and legal traditions interact. To solve problems in this arena,
one must perceive problems and possible solutions in the same manner as

principles. See Eser, supra note 3, at 119 (not suggesting a deficiency, simply reporting
the difference in approach).
6. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 41 (1971).
7. The German and the French Civil Codes provide the world with the two great
civilian code-based systems. States around the world essentially have adopted and
adapted either the French or the German paradigm. Christian Wolff (1679-1754)
founded the German Pandectist School, which was fruitful especially during the nineteenth century. It, like the French tradition, began with the premise that territorial and
political unity required a comprehensive, accessible, systematic, and coherent body of
law. The Pandectists esteemed mathematical precision in legal inquiry. Herman & Hoskins, Perspectives on Code Structure:HistoricalExperience, Modern Formats, and Policy Considerations,54 TUL. L. REV. 987, 1019 (1980).
Wolff's approach excluded all inductive and empirical elements through deduction,
without gaps, of all natural law rules from axioms down to the smallest details. Every
particular rule is derived from the previous, more general one, and so on, in the strictest
logical sequence. Structure and analysis require the exactness of geometrical proof, which
is achieved by a logical chain of reasoning through exclusion of the opposite. Thus, a
closed system is produced, whose validity is based in its freedom from logical contradiction of all its assertions. This tradition was expanded and developed over the years to its
culmination as a movement in 1862 in the work of Windschied. Id. (quoting F.
WIEACKER, PRIVATRECH-TSESCmCHTsE DER NEUZEIT 193; translated in DAWSON,
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 237 (1973)); see also S. SyMEoNIDEs, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 50-52 (5th ed. 1989).
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one's counterparts. Thus, to accomplish this goal, an understanding of
the theory behind the function is necessary.
Unless the capacity to understand legal theories and practices of other
states is developed further, international cooperation will continue to be
difficult. Confusion over other states' application of legal principles relating to jurisdiction causes disagreement and ultimately will result in denial of extradition and diminished cooperation in the arena of international criminal law.
This section attempts to analyze some of the basic concepts in the legal
theory relating to jurisdiction over matters of international criminal law.
Interestingly, United States jurisdictional theory has developed in a manner that interfaces well with that in German law. Although United
States law develops legal principles in a piecemeal, inductive, and sometimes incoherent fashion, once the principles are developed the analysis
used in applying them is very similar to analysis of deductive or codebased principles. The key in analyzing United States legal theory is to
determine the precise scope of the relevant principles. Consequently, this
section will concentrate first on United States notions of prescriptive jurisdiction that have evolved into principle. The authors then will compare this conceptualization to its counterparts in French and German
law. This comparison indicates that United States jurisdictional principles and their application are actually much closer to those in European
law than both sides generally believe them to be. In fact, United States
law possibly could accommodate the German concept of vicarious administration of justice' if it were understood properly. Although many bilateral treaties incorporate this concept, which is known widely in European law, many United States commentators are unfamiliar with it.9
The traditional substantive bases of prescriptive jurisdiction are well
known:10 territorial, protective, nationality, universal, and passive-personality.' 1 These bases provide the foundation upon which a state may

8. Meyer, The Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction, 31 HARv. Izrr'L L.J. 108, 116 (1990); D. Oehler, Agreements and Disagreements over International Criminal Law (unpublished manuscript on file with the Center
for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School); cf. Eser, supra note 3, at 127.
9. See Eser, supra note 3, at 119.

10. Harvard Research in InternationalLaw, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard
Research] (part of an effort by the American Society of International Law to codify
international law).
11. See M. BASSIouNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMEs: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1925 (1986) (providing references to jurisdictional clauses
in international criminal law conventions). The territorialtheory allows jurisdiction over
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assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct that violates the asserting
state's criminal law.
Defenses based on the "special use of double criminality" 12 may arise
when the jurisdictional laws of the requested and the requesting states
differ. If the requesting state seeks the extradition of a fugitive who has

committed an offense that is subject to extradition under a treaty and
within the requesting state's prescriptive jurisdiction, the state's domestic
law must provide prescriptive jurisdiction and extradition should be permitted. If, however, the requested state's law would not contemplate the
fugitive's conduct to be of a type or to have been done in a manner to
trigger its prescriptive jurisdiction under similar, but obverse, circumcriminal conduct, providing that a material element of the crime or its effect occurs
within the territorial boundaries of the state. The subjective territorialtheory is the basis
of jurisdiction when an element of an offense occurs within the territory. The objective
territorialtheory is the basis of jurisdiction when an effect of an offense impacts on the
asserting state's territory. The nationality theory bases jurisdiction on the allegiance or
nationality of the perpetrator of the offenses as proscribed by the state of his allegiance,
no matter where the offense takes place. See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279
(1808) (in dictum, the Court recognized the existence of the power to punish offenses
perpetrated extraterritorially by United States nationals); Blakesley, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 23-27 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986) (extensive discussion of and authority for the nationality principle); 21 U.S.C. § 955a(b)
(1984) (making it unlawful for any citizen of the United States on board any vessel
intentionally to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute). The protective
principle applies whenever the criminal conduct has threatened or had an impact on the
asserting state's national sovereignty, security, or important governmental function. Passive personality theory, on the other hand, applies simply on the basis of the victim's
nationality. The universality theory, which allows any forum to assert jurisdiction over
particularly heinous or universally condemned acts, may be asserted when no other state
has a prior interest in asserting jurisdiction.
The passive personality theory is not widely accepted and has been rejected in the
United States, except perhaps in relation to recent anti-terrorism legislation. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 853 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.) (§ 1202, inserting ch. 113A into 18 U.S.C. as § 2331) [hereinafter Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act]. Although the language of this legislation
provides for jurisdiction over violence committed against United States nationals, the intended anti-terrorism application of the law suggests the protective principle, which is
more appropriate under the legal tradition of the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 92-98. All three branches of the United States Government traditionally have
rejected the passive personality basis because it generally has not been deemed appropriate or wise to assert jurisdiction over common crimes committed abroad against United
States nationals. Moreover, because of the paramount nature of the territorial principle
in criminal law, it is undesirable to extradite a defendant who has committed such an
offense against a foreign national in the United States.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 137-43.
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stances, extradition should be denied. The nationality basis for jurisdiction provides an example. If a French national accosted and violently
robbed another French national in the United States, French law provides jurisdiction to prosecute. On the other hand, extradition would be
denied under United States traditional territorial interpretation of jurisdiction because United States law does not provide for jurisdiction under
13
obverse circumstances.
Jurisdiction-based problems facing other states seeking extradition
from the United States are diminishing as United States law on jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime has expanded to meet and surpass that of
Europe. 4 The existing problem, however, arises when the United States
seeks extradition from European and other states. Unfortunately, perhaps because of zeal, frustration, or impatience, the United States sometimes resorts to abduction as a solution to unsuccessful extradition."5
The territorial principle is the primary basis of jurisdiction over crime
in virtually all states."' United States rhetoric and early jurisdictional
development, which indicated a strict territorial vision of jurisdiction,
have caused many European commentators to misunderstand the scope
of United States jurisdiction over crimes committed wholly or partly
abroad. Many Europeans without access to the plethora of recent United
States decisions have missed the recent expansive evolution of jurisdiction
assertion by the United States. Many have accepted at face value the
historically strongly held and forcefully articulated United States reluctance to assert jurisdiction over criminal conduct that takes place wholly
or partly abroad. This reluctance, however, clearly is breaking down.
European law has expanded to cover extraterritorial crime, so long as

13. This may not be true if the alleged criminal conduct is "terroristic violence." See
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 11: "(a) Homicide.-Whoever kills a national of the United States while such national is outside the
United States ... (c) whoever outside the United States engages in physical violence-(1)
with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the United States .... ") For
analysis of what "terroristic violence" might include, see C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2.
14. For an extensive discussion of this expansion, see Blakesley, supra note 11, at
33-50.
15. See Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990); see also United
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 909 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990);
Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The United States UnwarrantedAttempt to
Alter InternationalLaw in United States v. Yunis, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 121 (1990).

16. See D. Oehler, supra note 8, at 13-15; see also

GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE

§ 9,

para. 1; Blakesley, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing of jurisdiction in the United States,
France, and other countries).
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there is some meaningful connection with the asserting state.17 For example, the German Penal Code (GPO) provides for jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime when a special connecting factor exists, such as the
need to protect certain domestic1 8 or international legal interests. 9
The European trend is to make extradition more of an administrative
process, 20 and some proponents argue that the United States should mirror this trend. Such a movement, however, would be a serious mistake.
Unlike the United States, it is easier for European states to make extradition more of an administrative process while still protecting individual
rights. This process is facilitated by the existing European systems of
administrative or constitutional courts, which are designed both to protect against administrative abuses of power and to avoid violations of
civil liberties by agents of the state.
For example, the French conseil d'Otat 1 has entered the arena of extradition to "protect" civil liberties. The manner in which the administrative courts fit into the extradition process, however, is somewhat like
an appeal or habeas corpus action based on alleged civil liberties abuses.
Thus, confusion, and perhaps dysfunction from a civil liberty viewpoint,
arises in France in that a person found extraditable by the appropriate
chambre d'accusation generally is sent immediately to the requesting
state. As a result, some commentators have criticized severely the conseil
d'etat for entering this arena to protect individual liberties in a manner
that will apply only to an already extradited fugitive. 2 The criticism

17. In German, sinvoller Anknupfungspunkt is quite similar. See Eser, supra note
3, at 119.
18. Important domestic legal interests include planning a war of aggression, treason,
endangering external security, abduction, and casting political suspicion on one domiciled
or customarily resident within Germany.
19. Important international legal interests include crimes involving atomic energy,
explosives and radiation, attacks on air traffic, unauthorized dealings in narcotics, dissemination of pornography, encouraging prostitution, counterfeiting, and econbmic subsidy fraud. GERMAN PENAL CODE §§ 3-7, 9 reprinted in 28 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

(1987) (appendix).

20. R. MERLE & A. Vrru, TREATE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 424-34 (5th ed. 1988)
(describing Portugal and Panama).
21. French law establishes an Administrative Court system, culminating in the con-

seil d'etat, which hears cases involving abuses of power (des abus de pouvoir), in relation to extradition. Id. The conseil d'etat, however, is limited to considering the lggaliM
externe (the procedures applied) and cannot consider the lMgalitb interne (the merits of
the extradition decision) of the extradition order, issued by the chambre d'accusation.Id.

(listing authority).
22. Id.; G.
L'EXTRADrrION

LEVASSEUR,

LES AVATARS

148-49, 152 (1985).

Du

DROrr ET DE LA PRATIQUE DE
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stems from the recognition that this is the domain of the Extradition
23
Law of 1927, which does not provide recourse to the conseil d'btat.
The French system could work, however, if extradition were stayed
pending decision and if the conseil d'gtat were inserted into the process.
Civil liberties would be protected by allowing "appeal" of extradition
decisions in a manner that some commentators have argued ought to
happen in the United States.24 Such an "appeal" in the United States
would have to be judicial, as the United States does not have the
equivalent administrative court system. The United States system has not
developed an administrative structure that would protect against governmental abuse. United States Constitutional notions of checks and balances have left such protection for the judiciary. Thus, adopting an administrative approach to extradition would be a mistake.25
In a manner similar to most United States extradition treaties, article
I of the 1909 Extradition Treaty between France and the United States
provided in pertinent part that the parties "agree to deliver up persons
who, having been charged with or convicted of any of the crimes or of23. R. MERLE & A. ViTU, supra note 20, at 430.
24. There is currently no direct appeal by either the government or the fugitive from
a magistrate's decision that certifies the individual for extradition. David v. Attorney
General, 699 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832 (1983); Ornelas v.
Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 508 (1896). The 1984 Draft Extradition Reform Act, § 3195, allows appeal by the government or the accused fugitive. See 2 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 509 (2d ed. 1987).
25. In the context of the United States constitutional system, it is necessary that extradition, which requires the deprivation of a person's liberty, be judicial in nature. Extradition, since it impacts directly on a person's physical liberty, is proper only after a
judicial hearing, although it appears that some Eastern European states, along with Panama, Portugal, and Ecuador, place extradition under exclusive executive control. Nuir, A
Guide to the Law and Practice of InternationalExtradition, in 1 MODERN LEGAL
SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, at ch. 8, § 11(c)(2); R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 20, at
424 (mentioning Portugal and Panama). In the United States, an accused fugitive is
entitled not to a full scale trial on the merits, but to an evidentiary hearing that allows
"extensive inquiry [into] whether each charge satisfies the treaty requirements." Caplan
v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). An extradition hearing is required for
purposes of constitutional due process, because the fugitive's liberty is in jeopardy. A
judicial hearing is clearly a criminal proceeding, see Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 375
(1901) (noting that extradition is a proceeding of a criminal nature), although some
United States courts have not understood or recognized the criminal nature. See, e.g.,
United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215, 1224 (D. Conn. 1977) (refused prosecution
safeguards). The fugitive will be incarcerated immediately, and, if found extraditable,
will be sent to trial in the requesting state. Therefore, the judiciary of the requested state
is the proper authority to determine, from its own perspective, whether there is sufficient
evidence to extradite, the equivalent of holding a person over for trial. See C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2.
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fenses specified in the following article, committed within the jurisdiction
of one of the contracting parties." 2 This treaty, on its face, can be construed to provide jurisdiction to extradite whenever an extraditable offense triggers jurisdiction of either contracting party as defined by the
laws of either state. The term "jurisdiction" as used in extradition treaties, however, traditionally has been interpreted by United States courts
and commentators exclusively to connote territorial jurisdiction,27 which
historically has been the exclusive basis of jurisdiction over crime in An29
glo-American2 and European law.
Difficulties arise when a party attempts to extradite a fugitive who has
committed an extraditable offense for which the requesting state claims
jurisdiction, and the law of the requested state does not provide for jurisdiction under similar, but obverse, circumstances. For example, if a
French national accosted and robbed another French national on foreign
soil, French law would admit jurisdiction of its courts over the Subject
matter as long as the court could obtain jurisdiction over the person.
French courts could assert jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of
either the accused or the victim. On the other hand, extradition would be
denied under United States law.30
The drafters of the 1970 United States-French Supplementary Extradition Convention (Extradition Convention) attempted to resolve this

26. Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 6, 1909, United States-France, 37 Stat. 1526,
T.I.A.S. No. 872, art. I [hereinafter 1909 Extradition Treaty]; see also Supplementary
Convention to the Convention of Jan. 6, 1909, 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075 [hereinafter 1970 Supplementary Convention].
27. J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 299-304 (6th ed. 1963); 1 J. MOORE,
TREATIES ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION

135 (1891);

(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

RESTATEMENT

§§ 402-403 (1988) [here-

inafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(2) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; Moore,
Report on ExtraterritorialCrime and the Cutting Case, 1887 FOREIGN REL. 757, reprinted in E. DICKENSON, THE LAW OF NATIONS, CASES AND READINGS 673 (1929);

discussed in Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Legal ProtectionAgainst Terrorism, 19 CONN.
L. REV. 895 (1987) [hereinafter Blakesley, Jurisdictionas Protection];Blakesley, United
States JurisdictionOver ExtraterritorialCrime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109
(1982) [hereinafter Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction];Blakesley, supra note 2, at
685.
28. Perkins, The TerritorialPrinciple in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155
(1971).
29. D. Oehler, supra note 8, at 13-15; see also GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE § 9, para.
1; Blakesley, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing jurisdiction in the United States, France,
and other states).
30.

11.

This may not be true if the alleged criminal conduct is terrorism. See supra note
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problem by adding the following provision: "Without prejudice to the
jurisdictional provision of Article I of this Convention, when the offense
has been committed outside the territory of both contracting Parties, extradition may be granted if the laws of the requested Party provide for
the punishment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances."3 1 Although this language appears to provide an exception to
the traditional United States interpretation of "jurisdiction" in extradition treaties, it has not been interpreted in this fashion. If the drafters'
purpose was to provide such an exception, this purpose was negated by
connecting jurisdiction for extraditability to the law of the requested
party. In practical effect, the Extradition Convention changes very little.
In the hypothetical situation, it simply makes United States law on jurisdiction determinative for any extradition request. The provision would
allow the United States, which heretofore has had a more restrictive law
of jurisdiction, to seek extradition from France, which has had a more
expansive law of jurisdiction, and to apply the French law of jurisdiction
to determine extraditability. In the past, the United States normally
would not have requested extradition unless its more restrictive laws on
jurisdiction would allow prosecution. 2
There are at least two explanations for the wording of this addition to
the Extradition Convention. First, it could have been an attempt to allow
flexibility to expand the notion of jurisdiction for extradition beyond the
territorial principle as United States domestic law expands. Alternatively, it could have been a bungled attempt to allow France to obtain
jurisdiction over the person through extradition, if French law allowed,
even when United States law would not allow jurisdiction in similar circumstances. Either explanation reverses the judicial principle that jurisdiction in extradition treaties means territorial jurisdiction, and neither
violates the language of article I on its face. The former explanation,
however, is likely the more accurate, because it is emblematic of the difficulties facing negotiators in this arena. Indeed, jurisdictional law in the
United States has expanded to render the Treaty language workable and
fair.
United States law on jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes is expanding.3 The United States delegation proposed the additional provision, and apparently both sides agreed that the new clause would aid in
31. 1970 Supplementary Convention, supra note 26, art. I.
32. This result has changed in the past 10 years, as United States law has expanded
jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime. See Blakesley, supra note 11, at 3; C. BLAKEsLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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countering narcotic and counterfeiting offenses. The French delegation
decided that minimal expansion of extraditability beyond the territorial
principle is better than none. Since that time, United States law relating
to territorial jurisdiction has expanded through the creation of exceptions
and development of fictions to expand the concept of territoriality. Further, the United States adopted theories of prescriptive jurisdiction and
executive authority to effectuate such expansion. 4
Many European commentators 5 suggest that United States law generally does not allow jurisdiction under circumstances in which the result
of a crime occurs abroad. While this has been true in the past, expansion
of and exceptions to territorial theory recently have eroded heretofore
rigid notions of territoriality. Courts apply fictions and exceptions, even
to transfuse actions taken abroad or effects occurring abroad, into the
United States notion of territoriality."6

34. Id. The passive personality jurisdiction appears applicable to terroristic violence.
Indeed, the Justice Department recently "authorized" the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to make arrests in foreign states without the authorization of the foreign
government. It is highly questionable, however, whether the Justice Department can authorize such action. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement
of William Barr, U.S. Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter Barr Statement]; Press
Conference with Judge William Sessions, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Fed. News Service (Nov. 7, 1989); Recent Development, The Domestic and International Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminalsfrom Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 573 (1990); Marcus, FBI Told It Can Seize FugitivesAbroad, The Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1989, at A15.
This power was later extended to the military. See Second Barr Statement, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 21, 1989, at A21; see also Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d
255 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991). If an FBI agent or
military person makes such an arrest or abduction, the agent is subject to arrest by the
local authorities. The avowed reason for the expansion of jurisdiction and abduction is
United States frustration over its perceived difficulties in extraditing fugitives. It is also
part of an overall expansion of executive power in both the criminal and international
arenas.

35. See D. Oehler, supra note 8; D. OEHLER, INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT 497
(2d ed. 1983); see also P. BOUZAT & J. PINATEL, TRArrI DE DRorr PANAL ET DE
1325 (1969); R.

& A. Vrru, TRAITS DE DROIT CRIMINEL:
329 n.2 (2d ed. 1973); I. SHEARER,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 94 (1971); Meyer, supra note 8; cf. Meyer,
German CriminalLaw Relating to InternationalTerrorism, 60 U. CoLO. L. REv. 571
(1989); Lagodny, The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism: A Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism?, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 583, 586-88 (1989).
36. Indeed, objective territoriality has expanded so far that an effect is deemed to
CRIMNOLOGIE
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Most commentators also suggest that United States law does not provide for jurisdiction based on the "active personality" or the nationality
principle.37 This still is true to a degree, but United States law has accepted a limited active personality or nationality theory of jurisdiction."
The United States even has introduced the notion of passive personality
into law, at least insofar as it relates to terrorist violence against United
States nationals. 9 Moreover, recent United States decisions have allowed
assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime even when no territorial basis existed.4 ° Thus, while some attention still is given to the notion
of territoriality being the basis of jurisdiction, United States jurisdiction
over crimes committed wholly or partly abroad is as expansive as that of
European states. Analysis of the bases of jurisdiction currently followed
in the United States indicates that it is not as inconsistent as heretofore
perceived with those in Europe. Consequently, international cooperation
in this modern setting should be easier today than in the past.
III.

TERRITORIALITY IN GENERAL: THE PRINCIPLE OF UBIQUITY

The German principle of ubiquity provides that a crime is deemed to
have occurred in the place where the perpetrator acted or in the place
where the statutorily proscribed harm occurred.4 Some commentators
contend that the German principle of ubiquity does not exist under
United States law.4 2 In reality, however, United States law has developed a parallel. Although this parallel suffers from development in an ad
hoc, casuistic fashion. and requires clearer articulation, it does exist.
The United States parallel to the German concept of ubiquity is the
combination of the objective territoriality or effects theory and the subjective territoriality theory in which a constituent element of the offense
occurs in the United States.43 United States jurisdiction law has long
allowed prosecution of alleged criminal offenders who caused or perhave occurred in the United States, even when a conspiracy is thwarted extraterritorially,

and when no conduct or impact at all has taken place. For a full discussion and critique
of this aberration, see C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
37. See D. Oehler, supra note 8; D. OEHLER, supra note 35, at 497; Meyer, supra
note 8, at 31.
38. Blakesley, supra note 11, at 25-27.
39. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 11, at
853.
40.

United States case law has adopted the protective principle, the passive personal-

ity principle (when connected with terrorism), and the universality principle.
41.

GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE § 9, para. 1; D. Oehler, supra note 8.

42.
43.

D. Oehler, supra note 8, at 15-17.
Blakesley, supra note 11, at 8-19.
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formed a material element of their offense on United States territory.
A.

The Subjective Prong of the Ubiquity Theory

The subjective territorial principle is best exemplified in the following
hypothetical. An individual sends poisoned cookies from a European
state to a United States resident. The victim, as intended, eats the cookies
and dies.44 This raises the question of whether United States law would
provide for jurisdiction or extradition. 45 Most European states would
consider the murder to have been committed in the state from which the
poisoned cookies were sent, and the criminal would be punished in that
state for the completed murder. This exemplifies the subjective territorial
theory, which provides that a forum state will have jurisdiction over a
homicide when the conduct within the forum state constitutes an attempt
to commit homicide, even though the death occurs outside the state. 46
Some European commentators believe that extradition would not be
available for such an occurrence under the current United States-German Extradition Treaty (German Treaty or Treaty)."7 The Treaty provides that extradition is available "for an offense committed within the
.territory of the Requesting State .... "*Although an appropriate jurisdictional basis exists to extradite the defendant, the United States traditionally has interpreted the term "jurisdiction" in extradition treaties to
mean "territorial jurisdiction.' 9 The conduct involved, however, would
fit within the modern notions of territorial jurisdiction in the United
States. The same would hold true for extradition relations between the
United States and most other European states.
The crime described in the hypothetical falls within the German con-

44. D. Oehler, supra note 8 (presenting the hypothetical).
45. See Treaty of Extradition Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United States of America, art. 1, § 1, 32 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 9785 (entered into
force Aug. 29, 1980) [hereinafter German Extradition Treaty]; 1986 Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, Treaty Doc. 100-6, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Extraditable offenses under the Treaty are offenses which are
punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties.") (ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany, 1988 B.G.B.II 1086 (W. Ger.) (has not yet received the advice and
consent of the United States Senate).
46. See People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.03 (proposed draft) (1962).
47. See German Extradition Treaty, supra note 45, art 1.
48. Id. art. 1, § 1.
49. In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1873); 2 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW DIGEST 232-40 (1906); 1 J. MOORE, supra note 27, at 135; Moore, supra note
27, at 757.
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cept of ubiquity. Therefore, Germany would consider itself to have jurisdiction. Similarly, United States law provides for jurisdiction under the
subjective territoriality theory if the obverse circumstances were to occur.
The federal system in the United States has necessitated the development
of the United States equivalent of the ubiquity principle. Indeed, the
reality of more than fifty state or territorial jurisdictions interrelating
with a system of federal criminal law would render a strictly applied
territorial theory dysfunctional.
The United States commonly asserts jurisdiction over offenses consummated outside United States territory when a constituent element of the
offense occurs in the United States." Individual states within the United
States also have asserted jurisdiction in obverse circumstances when an
element of the offense charged has taken place within that state, even
though the result occurred elsewhere."' The sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that a criminal defendant enjoys the
right to a "jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed." 52 Thus, courts consider the crime to have occurred
within the territory of a state either when the proscribed result-under
the objective territoriality theory-or a constituent element-under the
subjective territoriality theory-has taken place therein.
United States law considers the crime to have occurred where the effect or result impacted, which is the objective territoriality principle. In
the previously discussed hypothetical, the United States would recognize
that the country from which the poison was sent also would have jurisdiction. Thus, concurrent or conflicting jurisdiction would exist, and the
issue of extradition would depend on determining a hierarchy of jurisdictional bases. 53 The defendant would be extraditable from the United
States either before or after prosecution and enforcement, depending on
50. United States v. Inco Bank & Trust Corp., 845 F.2d 919, 920 n.4 (11th Cir.
1988) (the subjective territorial theory, without resort to any theory of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, supports prosecution of a conspiracy occurring partly within the United
States).
51. See People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 686 (1925); People v. Zayas, 217
N.Y. 78, 111 N.E. 465 (1916); State v. Sheehan, 33 Idaho 553, 196 P. 532 (1921);
People v. Licenziata, 199 A.D. 106, 191 N.Y.S. 619 (1921); People v. Botkin, 132 Cal.
231, 64 P. 286 (1901) (mailing poisoned candy from California to victim in Delaware,
who died in Delaware; California exercised jurisdiction); see generally Blakesley, United
States Jurisdiction,supra note 27, at 1118-23 (discussing additional authority).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; cf.United States v. Jackalow, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 484
(1861); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (1990); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 778(a) (West
1985); Blakesley, supra note 11, at 13-16.
53. See infra notes 300-314 and accompanying text; see also C. BLAKESLEY, supra
note 2.
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the hierarchy and priority of the case, because there is an appropriate
jurisdictional basis that both states recognize. The German Treaty 5 provides that the fugitive would be extraditable under the subjective territoriality theory.55
Thus, a state could assert and approve jurisdiction over larceny by
fraud, for example, even though the delivery and acceptance of the goods
occurred outside the territory, as long as a material element of the offense occurred within the territory from which the goods were sent. 56
Similarly, jurisdiction over a homicide is considered appropriate when
to commit the
the conduct within the forum state constitutes an attempt
57
homicide, even though death occurs outside the state.
The subjective territoriality theory requires that a material element
occur within the state. 58 The Model Penal Code,5 9 the proposed Federal
Criminal Code,"0 and the law of many states all require that the conduct
which occurs within the state constitute at least an attempt to commit the
crime before jurisdiction may be asserted over a crime consummated elsewhere."' In addition, United States law traditionally has allowed jurisdiction over participants in this country when their cohorts have committed offenses abroad.62 Thus, in this hypothetical, United States
jurisdiction would arise under the subjective prong of the German ubiquity theory of jurisdiction.

54. See German Extradition Treaty, supra note 45, art. 1, § 1.
55. Blakesley, supra note 11, at 13-16.
56. People v. Zayas, 217 N.Y. 78, 111 N.E. 465 (1916).
57. Conners v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 311, 508 P.2d 1185 (1973); People v. Botkin,
132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901); see also Schwab, Have Crime, Will Travel: Borderlines
and California CriminalJurisdiction, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 30 (1975); Berge, Criminal
Jurisdiction and the TerritorialPrinciple, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 238 (1931).
58. Blakesley, supra note 11, at 13-16.
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (1962) (proposed draft).
60. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1979-80); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess § 111(c) (1979) (Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980). In the proposed Federal
Criminal Code, the United States Congress for the first time provided a general rule
regarding the nature and scope of jurisdiction over crime that occurs in whole or in part
extraterritorially. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT 21 (1970); Feinberg, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
and the ProposedFederal Criminal Code, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385 (1981).
61. See, e.g., People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925); People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 286 (1901).
62. F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 333 (12th ed. 1932).
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B.

19

The Objective Prong of the Ubiquity Theory

United States law traditionally calls for jurisdiction to arise over conduct that takes place abroad, but results in harmful effects within the
United States. 3 Justice Holmes, for example, noted that "[aicts done
outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental
effects within it, justify a state in punishing a cause of the harm as if he
had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him
Thus, the United States could exercise jurisdiction
within its power.
in the hypothetical under the effects or objective territorial prong of the
ubiquity theory.
The objective and subjective territorial theories, therefore, have been
expanded liberally to mitigate conflicts that arose in the past because of
strict application of the territoriality principle. The difficulties suggested
by European commentaries relating to those offenses in which an effect
or a constituent element occurs within either state's territory, can therefore be avoided.

63. John Bassett Moore stated long ago that objective territoriality is "[t]he principle
that a man [sic] who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a force to take effect in
it is answerable at the place where the evil is done, is recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries." Moore, supra note 27, at 771, Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S.
280 (1911); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981); People v. Fea, 47 N.Y.2d 70, 390 N.E.2d
286, 416 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1979); Commonwealth v. McCloon, 101 Mass. 1 (1869).
64. Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285; cf.Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 319 (1860) (Michigan
asserted jurisdiction over homicide defendant in case in which victim was wounded on
board a United States flag vessel in Canadian waters, but died in Michigan). The British
system similarly recognizes jurisdiction over such offenses, generally denominating them
"terminatory." Williams, Venue and the Ambit of Criminal Law, 81 L.Q. REv. 518,
518 (1965); G. GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 63 (2d ed. 1978) (recognizing the subjective territorial basis in "conduct" crimes). For a general overview of
British jurisdiction theory, see Hirst, JurisdictionOver Cross-FrontierOffences, 97 L.Q.
REv. 80 (1981); Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecution, 1971 App. Cas. 537, 543
(1970) (defining blackmail as a conduct crime, thus creating jurisdiction if any of its
elements occur in England).
Murder is considered a result crime providing jurisdiction in England, if "any part of
the proscribed 'result' takes place in England." Secretary of State for Trade v. Markus,
197.6 App. Cas. 35, 61 (1975). French law provides for jurisdiction in these circumstances as well. For a detailed analysis of French law relating to subjective and objective
territoriality, see Blakesley, supra note 2,at 691-94, 695-99; C. BLAKESLEY, supra note
2,at ch. 3.
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CRIMES COMMITTED IN THIRD STATES OR CRIMES AGAINST
OR BY NATIONALS OF THE REQUESTING STATE-OTHER
"MEANINGFUL TOUCHPOINTS"6

5

The United States-German Extradition Treaty provides that "[w]hen
the offense has been committed outside the territory of the Requesting
State the Requested State shall grant extradition subject to the provisions
described in this treaty [if] its laws would provide for the punishment of
such an offense committed in similar circumstances . . . ." This provision raises the issue of what common jurisdictional principles exist to
allow extradition when the offense has no territorial basis. Professors
Eser, Oehler, and Meyer suggest that the unavailability of means to assert jurisdiction under United States law in circumstances in which the
67
German doctrines of ubiquity and "vicarious administration of justice"
would work in Germany results in a significant strain on the cooperation
between the United States and Germany in international criminal law
matters. This may be true to a degree, but as the following discussion
indicates, much of what triggers German jurisdiction also is sufficient
under United States law. Thus, either extradition or prosecution under
an equivalent to the vicarious administration of justice doctrine will be
possible.
A.

The Protective Principle

Law in Europe and in the United States provides jurisdiction on the
basis of the protective principle. Under United States law, this principle
is relevant when an extraterritorial offense has or could have an adverse
effect on or pose a danger to United States security interests, integrity,
sovereignty, treasury, or other important governmental functions. In the
objective and subjective territorial theories, an effect or material element
of an offense occurs on the asserting state's territory. Under the protective principle, however, no impact or element need occur within that
state's territory. The asserting state has jurisdiction over conduct meeting
the requisites, whether committed by a national or foreigner. 8 The focus
65. In German, sinnvoller Anknupfungspunkt, Eser, supra note 3, at 117.
66. German Extradition Treaty, supra note 45, art. 1, § 2.
67. In German, the term stellvertretende Strafrechtspflege is translated roughly to
mean vicarious administration of justice or the "representation principle," as there is no
corresponding expression in United States law. Lagodny, supra note 35, at 587; Meyer,
supra note 35, at 571. It also is called "substitutionary jurisdiction." See Jescheck, Development and Future Prospects, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 83 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
68. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968); see also United
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of this principle is the nature of the interest that is or may be injured,
rather than the place where the harm occurs.
United States v. Layton 9 is an example of United States application
of the protective principle. The defendant, Larry Layton, was charged
with conspiracy to murder Leo Ryan, a representative of the United
States Congress;70 aiding and abetting the murder of a United States
congressional representative;7 1 conspiracy to murder an internationally
protected person;7 2 and aiding and abetting the attempted murder of an
internationally protected person.7 3 The United States district court found
that it had proper subject matter jurisdiction over all counts.7 4 The court
applied several bases of jurisdiction,75 including objective territoriality,"
the protective principle, the nationality theory, and the passive personal-

States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Keller, 451 F.
Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978); Blakesley, supra note 2, at 701-06 (providing a full
discussion of this assertion of jurisdiction).
69. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 212.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 351(d) (Supp. 1990) (proscribing conspiracy to kill or kidnap
members of Congress, among other officials). The defendant was indicted on four criminal counts arising from events occcurring at the Port Kaituma airport in Guyana on
November 18, 1978. These events resulted in the death of Congressman Leo Ryan and
the wounding of Richard Dwyer, the Deputy Chief of Mission for the United States in
the Republic of Guyana. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 214.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 351(a) ("whoever kills a member of Congress [or other officials]
...
shall be punished .... 1).
72. Layton was charged also in connection with the wounding of a diplomat, the
United States deputy chief of mission in Guyana. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 214; see also
18 U.S.C. § 1117 (1972) (providing punishment for these offenses).
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1116(a)2 ("[w]hoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official,
official guest, or internationally protected person shall be punished as provided under
sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title.").
74. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 216.
75. The court noted, for example, that "the courts of the United States have repeatedly upheld the power of Congress to attach extraterritorial effect to its penal statutes,
particularly where they are being applied to citizens of the United States." Id. at 215
(citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); United States v. Baker, 609
F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850-51 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977)). The court found jurisdiction appropriate
under the objective territoriality theory, the protective principle, the nationality theory,
and the passive personality principle. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 216.
76. The Layton court relied on the objective territorial theory, stating, "[tihe objective territorial principle, which allows countries to reach acts committed outside territorial limits, but intended to produce, and producing, detrimental effects within the nation . . . ... Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 215 (citing Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280, 285
(1911)).
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ity theory."7
The court, however, emphasized the protective principle and held that
the effect of killing Representative Ryan effectively impaired an important governmental function. The court noted that the murder also caused
damage to United States sovereignty 8 in that "[a]n attack upon a member of Congress, wherever it occurs, equally threatens the free and
proper functioning of government. "M The court noted further that if it
did not have jurisdiction over action in which members of Congress were
attacked while abroad, the United States would have no legal recourse to
remedy or punish clear obstruction of and injury to important governmental function, sovereignty, and integrity. 0
The killing of Representative Ryan constituted an extraterritorial act
of terrorism and generally met the requisites of the protective principle 1
and the vicarious administration of justice doctrine. Statutes and a multilateral convention provided jurisdiction for this type of proscribed conduct. 2 Until 1986, however, United States laws and conventions did not
address extraterritorial violence against non-internationally protected
persons unless the violence occurred pursuant to a hijacking, sabotage of
aircraft, or other specifically articulated form of internationally prohibited conduct.
To ensure legislative, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction over
matters of extraterritorial violence committed against United States nationals not within the scope of the "internationally protected," Congress
promulgated the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act
of 1986 (Anti-Terrorism Act or Act). 3 Judicial development and com-

77. Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 216.
78. The court stated that "[t]he alleged crimes certainly had a potentially adverse
effect upon the security or governmental functions of the nation, thereby providing the
basis for jurisdiction under the protective principle." Id.
79. Id. at 219.
80. Id. For additional discussion on the protective principle and citation to additional
authority, see Blakesley, Jurisdictionas Protection, supra note 27, at 932-38; C. BLArKESLEY,

supra note 2.

81. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 903 n.14 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859
F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-93 (D.C. Cir.
1991); see also Blakesley, Terrorism, Law, and Our ConstitutionalOrder, 60 COLo. L.
REV. 471 (1989).
82. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (entered into force by the United States Feb. 20, 1977); see also 18
U.S.C. 351; 18 U.S.C. 1116, 1117; discussed in United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp.
212 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. 1990) (jurisdiction over extraterritorial violence). Arti-
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mentary since the adoption of the Act suggests that it covers use of violence against a national to gain some advantage or other end in a manner that impacts on the sovereignty, foreign policy machinery, or
decision-making process, or otherwise influences, intimidates, or impacts
on some important governmental function. Thus, since 1986, the other
"meaningful touch points" (sinnvoller Anknupfungspunkt)" currently
existing in German law appear to have established a place in United
States law, at least with regard to conduct related to terrorism or combined with the protective principle.
Whether the German concept of the protective principle is more expansive than that of the United States is unclear. Professor Meyer reports that the basic premise of Germany's protective principle is that the
state will subject "offenses committed abroad by foreigners (as well as by
citizens) to its punitive power if thereby domestic interests are endangered or violated."' 85 Thus, the first element of the protective principle,
which provides jurisdiction over offenses that endanger state security, is
similar to that in United States law. The protective principle in Germany also obtains jurisdiction over conduct impacting or threatening impact on other important public interests, such as protection of the national economy, false statements, perjury, and breach of trade secrets. 88
In the United States, jurisdiction similarly will arise either when
courts view criminal conduct as an affront to the sovereignty of the
United States or as having a deleterious influence on valid governmental
interests.87 With very few exceptions, the nations of the world adhere to
this principle and its limitations.88

des (a)-(c) proscribe actual and attempted "terrorist" murder, manslaughter, violent as-

sault, and conspiracy to commit homicide. The theory supporting this legislation appears
to be the protective principle, not the passive personality theory, in that it is designed to

prohibit "terrorist violence" against United States nationals. See generally Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Protection, supra note 27, at 938; Blakesley, supra note 81, at 471.
84. These include active and passive personality, and universality. Eser, supra note
3, at 117.

85. Meyer, supra note 8 (citing Eser, Sch5nkelSchrider, in STRAF-GESETZBUCH:
§§ 8-7 (22d ed. 1985)); Eser, Die Entwicklung des Internationalen
Strafrechts, in FEsTSCHRIFT FUR HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK 1353-77 (1985); H. JEsKOMMENTAR

CHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS

127 (3d ed. 1978).

§ 5; Meyer, supra note 8, at 112-14.
87. Blakesley, supra note 11, at 21-22; C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2.
86.

GERMAN PENAL CODE

88. E.g., French C. Pr. Pen. art. 694 (Dalloz 1987-88); reviewed by Blakesley, supra
note 2, at 702-04.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

B.

LAW

[VoL 24.1

Passive Personality

German law sometimes categorizes the passive personality principle as
a form of the protective principle."9 The German Penal Code extends the
application of German criminal law to offenses committed extraterritorially against German nationals.9 0 United States law traditionally has rejected the passive personality principle.91 Even with regard to passive
personality, however, the gap between the United States and other nations' jurisdictional principles has diminished. Although the passive personality principle is still in disrepute, at least in the arena of international terrorism, the United States has asserted jurisdiction over certain
attacks committed abroad against United States nationals.92 The passive
personality principle standing alone still is not part of United States law.
It has been used, however, in conjunction with the protective and universality principles in relation to allegations of terrorism to assure United
States legislative, adjudicatory, and enforcement jurisdiction.
The passive personality theory grants a state the authority to prosecute and punish perpetrators of criminal conduct that harms or is intended to harm a national of the asserting state. The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law provided the traditional repudiation of
the principle in United States law.9" The Restatement (Third) also does
not list passive personality as a basis for jurisdiction,94 and the United
States Government vehemently protested attempts to assert jurisdiction

89. Meyer, supra note 8, at 112-14.
90. GERMAN PENAL CODE § 7(1); Meyer, supra note 8, at 112-13. This theory of
jurisdiction is applicable only if the conduct is punishable under the law where the conduct occurred or, less likely, if there is no law enforcement where the crime was committed. Id. at 113. Germany may punish the conduct more rigorously than would the nation
in which the offense occurred.
91. Blakesley, supra note 11, at 28-31.
92. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901-03 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953
(D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Protection, supra note 27, at 938-42. At least one federal
circuit has relied explicitly on the passive personality principle to assert jurisdiction over
foreign nationals who commit offenses abroad against United States nationals. United
States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984) (Columbian charged with conspiracy to murder DEA agent). That case, however, could be read to fit more properly
within the protective principle.
93. "A State does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching a legal
consequence to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the
conduct affects one of its nationals." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 27, § 30(2)
comment e. This repudiation remained unchanged after the recent revision. RESTATEM-NT (THIRD), supra note 27, §§ 402-403.

94.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD),

supra note 27, § 402.
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based on the passive personality principle.9 5 Nevertheless, the United
States Congress promulgated the Anti-Terrorism Act, which applies
United States law to terrorist violence inflicted on United States nationals abroad. 6 As a result of this Act 97 and recent judicial decisions,9 8 the
aspect of the passive personality involving terroristic violence may trigger
United States jurisdiction.
C.

The Active Personality or Nationality Principle

European states, unlike the United States, apply a broad active personality principle. They maintain that nationality is a link so strong that
the state may prosecute any of its nationals for offenses they commit
anywhere in the world, so long as the offense is punishable in the place
where it was committed. This theory underlies the importance of the
state maintaining its sovereignty over each national and in maintaining
its respect internationally by punishing its own wrongdoers. European
nations generally do not extradite their own nationals, and old treaties

95. Moore, supra note 27, at 757.
96. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. The Act actually was intended to
provide for a protective or universality principle type of jurisdictional basis and to limit
its application to terror-violence. Section 2331(e) provides: "No prosecution for any offense described in this section shall be undertaken by the United States except [when] ...
in the judgment of the certifying official, such offense was intended to coerce, intimidate,
or retaliate against a government or a civilian population." The legislative history to the
Act provides: "[T]he committee of conference does not intend that chapter 113A reach
nonterrorist violence inflicted upon American victims. Simple barroom brawls or normal
street crime, for example, are not intended to be covered by this provision." H.R. REP.
No. 494, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 87 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS

1865, 1960.

97. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. 1989) (ch. 113A, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over
Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United States Nationals").
98. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The United States
recognizes nationality of the victim as the basis for criminal jurisdiction.") (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2331); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953
(D.C. Cir. 1988). See Abramovsky, supra note 15, at 121; Recent Development, U.S.
Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists:Antiterrorismor Legalized Kidnapping?, 18 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 916 n.2 (1985); see also Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the
1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE I. INT'L L. 158, 16468 (1987).
99. See, e.g., The Extradition Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Gesetz fiber
die Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, of 1982, BGB1.I 2071 (1982) [hereinafter
Extradition Law of the Federal Republic of Germany]; France, La loi relative A
l'Extradition des Etrangers [1927] D.P. IV, Mar. 10, 1927, reprinted in Code de Procdure Pfnale, immediately after art. 696 (Dalloz 1989-90) [hereinafter Extradition Law
of 1927].
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between the United States and European states provided that "neither
party shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the
stipulations of this Convention."'1 " Exempting nationals from extradition is not uncommon from either historical or contemporary viewpoints."0 Greek city-states, Rome, and other great civilizations exempted
their citizens from extradition.1 0 2 Similarly, Native American tribes refused to deliver their members to outsiders.1 0 3
The modern practice of exempting nationals from extradition appears
to have been initiated and developed by France. In the mid-eighteenth
century, the extradition treaties between France and its adjacent neighbors exempted nationals of the requested state from extradition. 0 Napoleon attempted to reverse the trend by issuing a decree that French
nationals could be extradited. The decree, however, was never executed. 0 5 Professor Billot maintains that French public law prohibited
the extradition of nationals as early as 1788,08 although others claim
that the Parliament of Paris declared the exemption as early as 1555 .107
The French Minister of Justice formally promulgated a circulaire in

100. 1909 Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. V. For a discussion of the extradition of nationals generally, see I. SHEARER, supra note 35, at 34; R. RAFUSE, THE
EXTRADITION OF NATIONALS (1939); Baltatzis, La non-extradition des nationaux, 13
REV. HELLENiQUE DUE DRorr INT'L 190 (1960).
101. See T. Stein, J. Meyer & D. Oehler, Extradition Issues (papers presented at
the Harvard Conference on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters; papers on
file with the Harvard Journal International Law). 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 5, 108 (1990)
(providing summaries of Stein's and Meyer's papers). Of the 163 extradition treaties
printed in the League of Nations Treaty Series and the first 550 volumes of the United
Nations Treaty Series, 98 treaties except the national of the requested state absolutely,
57 provide the requested state a discretionary right to refuse to surrender its nationals,
while only eight provide for extradition regardless of the nationality of the fugitive. I.
SHEARER, supra note 35, at 96, app. II.
102. I. SHEARER, supra note 35, at 95; Baltatzis, supra note 100, at 190, 197. The
Germanic tribes of Europe followed the same principle.
103. Crimes committed by members of the tribe against outsiders usually were not
considered to be crimes, and "extradition" was refused. The most severe penalty for
intratribal crimes, however, was banishment. See Fairbanks, A Discussion of the Nation
State Status of American Indian Tribes: A Case Study of the Cheyenne Nation' 31
(1976) (unpublished thesis on file in the Columbia University Law Library).
104. Aupecle, L'Extradition et la Loi de 10 mars 1927 15 (Paris, 1927) (unpublished thesis on file in the Columbia University Law Library).
105. See'BILLOT, TRAITA DE L'EXTRADITION 70-72 (1874); see also I. SHEARER,
supra note 35, at 104.

106. See I.

SHEARER, supra note

35, at 104.

107. Manton, Extradition of Nationals, 10
supra note 35, at 104 n.3.

TEMP.

L.Q. 12 (1935-36); I.

SHEARER,
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1841108 that prohibited the extradition of its nationals. Although France
subsequently negotiated extradition treaties with Great Britain and the
United States without including the clause exempting nationals, it has
never extradited one of its nationals under the treaties.1 09 Since 1884,
French treaty practice consistently has exempted nationals from extradition,1 ' and the French Extradition Law of 1927 specifically exempts
French citizens from extradition."'
The clause exempting nationals in the 1909 United States-French Extradition Treaty states that "neither party shall be bound to deliver up
112
its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this Convention."'
On its face, this clause falsely appears to allow discretionary extradition
of nationals. In fact, the French Extradition Law of 1927 expressly prohibits the extradition of French nationals." 3 In addition, the United
States Supreme Court held unequivocally that the exemption of nationals
clause in the 1909 Treaty creates an absolute bar to the extradition of

108.

Circulaire du Ministre de la Justice, Apr. 4, 1841, para. 2, cited in I.
supra note 35, at 104 n.5.
109. I. SHEARER, supra note 35, at 104; BILLOT, supra note 105, at 73. These were

SHEARER,

the last French extradition treaties that did not contain the exemption in some form.
Both treaties were negotiated in 1843.
110. This practice began with the Extradition Treaty between France and
Luxembourg.
111. Extradition Law of 1927, supra note 99, art. 5, para. 1.
112. 1909 Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. V.
113. "Extradition is not granted: 1. When the person, the object of the request, is a
French citizen or a person under French protection, the status of citizen or protected
person being determined as of the time of the offense for which the extradition is requested." Extradition Law of 1927, supra note 99, art. 5, para. 1. With regard to the
issue of the timing of the determination of the accused's nationality, the Court of Appeals
at Aix-en-Provence, V.C. Aix (chambre d'accusation), held that under this article of the
Extradition Law of 1927, France could surrender a fugitive from the justice of Italy who
had committed certain extraditable offenses in 1945, even though he had acquired his
French citizenship by naturalization in 1950. Decision of Mar. 15, 1951, 1951 J.C.P. II
No. 6243; 1951 I.L.R. 324 (No. 101) (1951). The Franco-Italian Extradition Treaty of
1870, then in effect, exempted the extradition of nationals, but extradition was approved
on the basis of the nationality at the time of the offense, as required by the law in 1927.
The determination of nationality for prosecution in France of French nationals committing crimes outside French territory is the opposite. The French Code de Procidure
Pbnal,art. 639 para. 3 provides that, before French courts have jurisdiction over offenses
committed abroad by French nationals, the nationality of the accused must be established
as of the day of the prosecution, not the day of the offense. French practice with regard
to the timing of the determination of nationality for extradition exemption purposes is
different from general international extradition practice. The determination of nationality for purposes of the exemption from extradition usually occurs as of the time of the
extradition hearing.
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United States citizens to France. 114

Although the United States Government would prefer simply to incorporate a clause explicitly allowing extradition of nationals, it has taken
four different approaches in extradition treaties to the extradition of nationals. The first approach, like the 1909 Convention between France
and the United States,11 5 provides that the parties to the Convention are
not bound to extradite their nationals. This is a complete and absolute
bar to extradition. The reports of international conferences 6 and many
commentators, however, have disparaged the practice of exempting nationals from extradition." 7 The second approach, which the 1970 Supplementary Convention adopted, creates no obligation to extradite nationals, but expressly endows the executive branch with discretionary
authority to extradite nationals on a case-by-case basis.1 8 The third ap-

114. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). The Court stated that this was a
matter of legal authority, not a matter of policy. The Court reasoned that the power to
extradite from the United States must be granted specifically in the terms of the extradition treaty. Extradition requires an affirmative statement of the power to extradite. The
Court considered the "exemption of Nationals" clause in the 1909 Extradition Treaty
between France and the United States, Art. V stated that: "Neither ..... [p]art[y] shall
be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this Convention," The Court refused to construe such a negative phrase as a grant of power to the
executive branch. Id. at 9-10.
115. 1909 Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. V.

116. The Institute of InternationalLaw Conference Report (1880) and the Conference pour I'Unificationdu DroitPinal (1935) provide for the extradition of nationals in
their reports. Cf Tenth Conference of International Criminal Law (1969) (provides discretion to extradite nationals); The European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957,
Europ. T. S. No. 24, art. 6 (allows the contracting parties the discretion to refuse the
extradition of nationals) [hereinafter European Convention on Extradition].
117. This includes French commentators. E.g., R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note
20, at 329; P. BOUZAT & J. PINATEL, supra note 35, at 1325-26.
118. Thus, many treaties have been amended. For example:
There is no obligation upon the requested State to grant the extradition of a person who is a national of the requested State, but the executive authority of the
requested State shall, insofar as the legislation of that State permits, have the
power to surrender a national of that State if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper
to do so.
Supplementary Convention of 1970, Between France and the United States, art. III,
amended art. V of the 1909 Extradition Treaty between France and the United States.
The minutes to the negotiations of this Proclamation read:
The United States representative explained to the French delegation the inability
of the United States to extradite its own nationals under the present Convention
and expressed a strong desire to rectify this situation. He explained that the
United States Supreme Court had decided (in Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S.
5 (1936)) that the French Convention did not, as indirectly required by the United
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proach is to remain silent on the subject of the extradition of nationals.11 The fourth approach provides expressly for extradition without
regard to nationality.12 °
The United States Government extradites its nationals pursuant to the
latter three approaches. When discretion to extradite nationals is expressly allowed, the courts have found that the executive branch has the
discretion, but not the obligation, to do so. 2 ' With regard to treaties that
are silent on the question of the extraditability of nationals, the United
122
States Supreme Court has held that nationals are extraditable.
Many European commentators, noting that the United States Government generally does not prosecute its nationals for crimes committed
abroad, suggest that while the United States Government may be willing
to extradite its nationals who commit crimes abroad, it may not be able
to do so because of lack of reciprocity.12 3 European states cannot extra-

States Constitution, grant the executive authority to extradite United States citizens. He noted that very few U.S. penal laws provided any form of extraterritoriality and that therefore unless such persons were returned to France, they would
not be able to be prosecuted in the United States. The French delegation explained
that their extradition law generally prohibited extradition of nationals and expressed opposition to the formula proposed by the United States. The United
States representative then suggested the article used in the United States-Brazil
Treaty of 1961 (article VII) to which the French delegation agreed.
Gaither, Minutes, Treaty Supplement Negotiations 5-6 (Paris, Nov. 1969) (Jan. 5,
1970) (on file in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State); see also Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, United States-Sweden, 14 U.S.T. 1845; T.I.A.S. No.
5496; Treaty of Extradition Jan. 13, 1961, United States-Brazil, 15 U.S.T. 2093;
T.I.A.S. No. 5691.
119. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, United States-Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S, No. 849.
120. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, Israel-United States, 14
U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5475.
121. In re Lucke, 20 F. Supp. 658, 659 (N.D. Tex. 1937).
122. In Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), the Supreme Court stated
[T]here is no principle of international law by which citizens are excepted out of
an agreement to surrender "persons," where no such exception is made in the
treaty itself. Upon the contrary, the word "persons" includes all persons when not
qualified as it is in some of the treaties between this and other nations. That this
country has made such an exception in some of its conventions and not in others,
demonstrates that the contracting parties were fully aware of the consequences
unless there was a clause qualifying the word "persons."
Id. at 467-68 (emphasis original). Canadian courts take the same view. In re Burley, 1
CAN. L.J. 34 (1865).
123. See, e.g., D. Oehler, supra note 8, at 20; R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 20,
at 413.
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dite their own nationals. 24 The first point is correct as a matter of general principle because of the traditional Anglo-American predilection for
territorial jurisdiction. Often, however, a basis for jurisdiction other than
the nationality of the perpetrator is available. A state may seek extradition whenever a United States national commits a crime that fits within
one of the other bases of jurisdiction accepted by United States law. If,
however, an existing extradition treaty prohibits extradition of a United
States national from the United States, extradition cannot be obtained.12 5
Since the early 1960s, extradition treaties have provided courts with
judicial discretion in extradition matters, and extradition of United
States nationals is clearly available and encouraged by the United States
Government.12 In some circumstances, generally when facts are too insignificant to trigger the protective principle standing alone, parties will
assert the nationality principle under United States law. Based on the
notions of state sovereignty, the United States Supreme Court has noted
that the state has legal authority under international and domestic law to
pass laws asserting jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct of those nationals, even if such nationals are travelling or residing outside its
1 27

territory.

Although United States jurisprudence generally disfavors application
of the nationality principle, courts do apply it in some situations. The
United States Supreme Court has noted that a state has legal authority
under international and domestic law to pass laws asserting jurisdiction
over the extraterritorial conduct of its nationals. This jurisdiction is
based on notions of state sovereignty. 12 8 Indeed, United States citizenship
or nationality often plays a significant role in applying United States
legislation to extraterritorial conduct.1

29

The Wisconsin Supreme Court,

124. Extradition Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 99; Extradition Law of 1927, supra note 99; D. Oehler, supra note 8, at 20.
125. See Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) (the phrase: "Neither...
[p]art[y] shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of
this convention" construed to be a negative statement and an absolute bar to extradition
of nationals); see also Blakesley, ExtraditionBetween Franceand the United States: An
Exercise in Comparative and International Law, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121,
689-94 (1980).
126. Blakesley, supra, note 125, at 689-94.
127. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 241 (1808) (dictum); see also Chief Justice Marshall's speech, Livingston's Resolution, United States House of Representatives, quoted in The Venus Case, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 127 n.1 (1820); Henfield's Case 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
128. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
129. See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1981); 18
U.S.C. § 953 punishes unauthorized attempts by United States nationals, "wherever

1991]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

for example, approved jurisdiction in the case of an extraterritorial violation of a penal clause in an absentee voting statute.1"' A federal district
court in Michigan asserted nationality jurisdiction and prosecuted
United States nationals who assisted the illegal immigration of foreign
contract laborers."3 ' Similarly, a murder committed by a United States
national on an uninhabited island was subject to prosecution in the
United States,"3 2 as were contempt judgments for failure to comply with
a subpoena served by a consular officer. 38 Sometimes the same conduct
committed by an alien and a national will be punishable only against the
national.' Thus, although the nationality principle is not as important
in United States law as it is in Europe, it is still a force in those areas
where nationality impacts on some other important state interest.

[they] may be," to influence 'a foreign government in its relations with the United States;
18 U.S.C. § 2383 ("[W]hoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States" shall be fined or imprisoned. No
jurisdictional limits are established.).
Nationality jurisdiction also has led to the prosecution of United States nationals assisting the illegal immigration of foreign contract laborers. United States v. Craig, 28 F.
795, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1886). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 applies to "any
employee or agent of such domestic concern who is a United States citizen, national, or
resident, or person who is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(dd-2), 104(b)(a)(B)(3); see also Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to
Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1987); Note, Questionable Payments by Foreign
Subsidiaries: The Extraterritorial
JurisdictionalEffect of the Foreign CorruptPractices
Act of 1977, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. Rlv. 151, 156 (1979). Jurisdiction extends
to extraterritorial failure to report under the Bank Secrecy Act or the Money Laundering Control Act. The Currency & Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act], (codified, variously, and significantly amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959, 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 53115324, and throughout 15 U.S.C.), reviewed by Zagaris, DollarDiplomacy: International
Enforcement of Money Movement and Related Matters-A United States Perspective,
22 GEo. WAsH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 465, 469 n.16 (1989) (providing an excellent
analysis of the new crimes and official reaction to them); Plombeck, Confidentiality and
Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22
INT'L LAW. 69 (1986). Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, part of Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 100 Stat. 2307,3218-39 (codified
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.; and 31 U.S.C.); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.;
18 U.S.C.; and 31 U.S.C.).
130. State v. Main, 16 Wis. 422, 446 (1863).
131. United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1886).
132. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
133. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 441 (1932).
134. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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Clearly, however, the United States Government is not interested in
prosecuting most common crimes against its nationals simply because
they are United States nationals. As a result, the United States will extradite its nationals to foreign states when the requesting state has a
basis for jurisdiction.
The United States, without requiring reciprocity,135 will extradite its
nationals to nations that have an appropriate basis of jurisdiction.1 3 The
policy preference of the United States Government is to extradite fugitives regardless of their nationality, and United States treaty negotiators
always attempt to include a clause expressly allowing extradition of nationals. When domestic extradition law, such as that of France or Germany, precludes inclusion of these clauses, the United States generally
suggests including language that expressly provides the executive branch
with the discretion to extradite nationals. This allows the United States
to maintain its policy of extraditing its nationals whether or not the
other party reciprocates. Most commentators from outside the United
States believe that such clauses are meaningless, because the foreign state
will require reciprocity. They make the error, however, of perceiving the
United States position from the European perspective, which is that nationality is a fundamentally important concept. To the contrary, treaties
include these clauses precisely for the purpose of allowing extradition
despite lack of reciprocity. Moreover, United States policy allows for
flexibility without renegotiation in case the foreign state changes its internal extradition law or, in the case of Germany, its Constitution. The
discretionary extradition of nationals clauses allow the extradition of
United States nationals without either accepting or deprecating the internal extradition law of the other contracting party.
D.

The Special Use of Double Criminality

International cooperation still suffers from the problem presented by
the 1873 extradition decision In re Stupp.'37 In Stupp, a New York
court decided that the defendant, a Prussian subject whose extradition
.had been requested by the Prussian government for the crimes of murder, arson, and robbery committed in Belgium, should be surrendered to
Germany pursuant to the United States-German Extradition Treaty of
1852. The Treaty of 1852 provided that extradition should be allowed
for offenses committed "within the jurisdiction" of the requesting party.
135. Blakesley, supra note 125, at 689-94.
136. There is a problem with the "special use of double criminality." See Blakesley,
supra note 2, at 743-53.
137. 23 F. Cas. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1873).
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Despite Prussia's claim of jurisdiction over Stupp, the United States followed the recommendation of the United States Attorney General and
13 8
declined surrender of the defendant to Prussia.
The Stupp case presents the special use of the double criminality principle in extradition and its relation to the nationality principle. This special use requires that the charged offense be punishable in each state and
that the theory of jurisdiction asserted over the offense be one recognized
by each state before the individual is extraditable." 9 In one case, for
example, a United States District Court in California deemed improper
an extradition of an individual from the United States to France based
on narcotics charges. The court considered it dispositive that there was
no evidence that the fugitive from France had conspired with anyone in
France, had performed any element of the offense in France, or had
caused any effect in France. 140

138. The Attorney General stated:
I am quite clear, that the words, "committed within the jurisdiction," as used in
the treaty, do not refer to the personal liabilities of the criminal, but to the locality.
The locus delicti, the place where the crime is committed, must be within the
jurisdiction of the party demanding the fugitive.
Id. at 294 (quoting an opinion of the United States Attorney General).
139. For a detailed study of the special use of the double criminality principle, see C.
BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 3; Blakesley, supra note 2, at 743-60; see also Ex parte
John Anderson, [1860] L.T.R. 622, reviewed in Ryan, Ex Parte John Anderson, 6
QUEENS L.J. 382 (1981); Richard Fiedler Case, MS Dep't of State file no. 312/1121
(1940) (instruction from counselor of United States Department of State to United States
Consul General in Mexico), cited in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 103-04 (1968). The double or dual criminality principle in extradition requires
that the conduct of the fugitive be criminal in both the requesting and the requested
state. Emami v. United States Dist. Court, 834 F.2d 1444, 1450 (9th Cir. 1987); Blakesley, supra note 125, at 672. This is based on the notion of nulla poena sina lege and
ensures that the accused will not be punished for conduct that is not criminal under the
law of the requested state. The dual criminality requirement is satisfied if the conduct
upon which the extradition request is based presents the "essential character" of the
conduct criminalized by the law of each state. Theron v. United States Marshall, 823
F.2d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 1988), quoting Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903). The
conduct allegedly perpetrated must be "generally criminal" in each state. Valentine v.
United States, 299 U.S. 5, 11 (1936); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933);
Emami, 834 F.2d at 1450; United States v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 731 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987). It is the
nature of the conduct that is important, not its name. Emami, 834 F.2d at 1450. Moreover, "each element of the offense purportedly committed in a foreign country need not
be identical to the elements of the similar offense in the United States." In re Russell,
789 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1986).
140. Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
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In re Lo Dolce141 graphically illustrates the problem that strict territorial jurisdiction causes when combined with the special use of double
criminality. In Lo Dolce, a United States Army sergeant committed a
murder in Italy during World War II. Italy did not assert jurisdiction
over the offense, and the offender returned to the United States. The
United States District Court held that the extradition treaty was inapplicable because the offense did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, and, consequently, the perpetrator escaped
1 42
prosecution.
If Germany were to request extradition from the United States of a
German national for prosecution of a crime under circumstances in
which United States law would not allow assertion of jurisdiction, the
United States possibly would deny the extradition pursuant to the special
use of the double criminality principle. This special use notion, however,
may be falling into disfavor. In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that even though "the United States generally does not prosecute citizens for crimes committed outside [its] borders," extradition was proper when a Swedish national was sought by
Sweden for having committed arson and insurance fraud for fires that
1 43
burned his own merchandise and buildings in Sweden and Denmark.
Thus, this holding exemplifies the United States trend to eliminate prior
limitations to extradition.
E.

The Universality Principle

Customary international law provides that certain offenses exist for
which any nation obtaining personal jurisdiction over an accused may
exercise and prosecute.14 4 The notion of universality is growing in importance and acceptance internationally.1 45 The German Penal Code

141. 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
142. Id.; see also Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Toth v. Quarles,

350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1948); United States v. Icardi, 140 F.
Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956); State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
143. Matter of Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1979).
144. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1985) cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (extradition decision explicitly recognizing the universality principle and its application in relation to conduct akin to genocide and war crimes); 2 H.
GROTIus, DE JURE BELM Ac PACiS LIBRIS TRES 504 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925); C.
BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at chs. 2, 3; Blakesley, Jurisdictionas Protection,supra note
27, at 911-20; Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEx. L.
REv. 785 (1988).
145. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Blakesley, United StatesJurisdiction,supra note 27, at 1140);
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subjects much more conduct to universality jurisdiction than does United
States law, 146 and Professor Meyer notes that the universality theory of
jurisdiction has a broad application in Germany. 147 Although parties
may assert universality jurisdiction in the United States for certain conduct condemned under United States law and condemned universally,
many problems of definition and designation remain. There is much discussion, for instance, over whether narcotics offenses fall in the category
of universality jurisdiction. The recently promulgated Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(UN Drug Convention), for instance, moves the world much closer to
universal jurisdiction over narcotics offenses.1 48 Expanding the universality principle causes many problems, however, and it probably still will
be difficult to find a consensus as to which narcotics offenses fit within
the principle. 49 Nevertheless, international convention and custom provide that several crimes trigger universal jurisdiction. These include
piracy, slave trade, war crimes, crimes against humanity, hijacking and
sabotage of civil-aircraft, genocide, and apartheid. 5 Thus, the problem
of jurisdiction and international cooperation may not be as grave as suggested by many European commentators.

see also C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 2; Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Protection,
supra note 27; Blakesley, supra note 81, at 471; Randall, supra note 144, at 785.

146.

Germany recognizes more significant connecting factors.

GERMAN PENAL CODE

§ 6 (Regardless of the law of the place of commission, the German criminal law also is
applicable to the following acts committed outside of Germany: genocide, crimes involving atomic energy, explosives and radiation, attacks on air traffic, encouragement of prostitution, unauthorized dealings in narcotics, dissemination of pornography, counterfeiting,
and others made punishable by the terms of an international treaty binding on the Federal Republic of Germany).
147.

Meyer, supra note 8, at 114; Meyer, supra note 35, at 571.

148.

U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15, Dec. 19, 1988, reprinted in 28 INT'L LEGAL
493 (1989) (signed by 106 states, including the United States). See Zagaris,
Developments in InternationalJudicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 339, 340-48 (1990); Zagaris, U.N. Drug Convention Signed, 5 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 80-87 (March 1989); cf.Bassiouni, Critical Reflections on Internationaland National Control of Drugs, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 311 (1990)
(current international and national approaches to international control of drugs are woefully deficient and prospects of the control method extremely remote).
MATERIALS

149. For discussion of some problems relating to its expansion, especially in relation
to narcotics offenses, see Blakesley, supra note 2, at 728-61; C. BLAKESLEY, supra note
2, at ch. 3.
150.

See Blakesley, Jurisdictionas Protection, supra note 27, at 913.
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F. The Notion of Vicarious Administration of Justice
The current desire to find solidarity among nations attempting to combat international and transnational crime suggests that the United States
is ready for the application of the doctrine of vicarious administration of
justice. Also, aut dedere aut punire (or aut iudicaire)51 suggests that if
the United States refuses to extradite a person who has committed an
offense against the law of a foreign requesting state, the United States
ought to prosecute that person if the conduct committed constituted a
crime under United States law. This is the principle of the vicarious
administration of justice, 52 which provides that if a state refuses to extradite an individual, that state shall prosecute him as long as the conduct involved serious and punishable behavior in the state in which the
153
conduct occurred.
Vicarious administration of justice is common in Europe and has been
adopted in several extradition treaties, although many commentators and
government representatives have difficulty accepting jurisdiction based
solely on the basis of a refusal to extradite."' The United States always
has taken aut dedere aut punire less seriously than have European
states, 5 5 but jurisdiction under this theory could proceed on the refusal
to extradite and an applicable theory of jurisdiction under United States
law. Such an approach would cause less consternation among United
States jurists. This approach presents a limited version of European vicarious administration of justice, but the significant expansion of United
States prescriptive jurisdiction results in a functionally similar principle.
It is uncertain whether current principles of jurisdiction in United

151. This is a latin maxim which essentially means that one either [aut] has to extradite or give back [dedere] or [aut] to punish [punire]. The more appropriate is aut
dedere aut iudicaire [either to extradite/give back, or adjudicate/initiate prosecution in
Anglo-American terms]. 2 H. GROTiUS, DE JURE BELLx Ac PAciS ch. XXXI, § 76, 77

(1758).
152. See Meyer, supra note 8, at 115-16; see also H. JEscHECK, supra note 1, at
143-64; D. OEHLER, supra note 35, at 413-15; Eser, Abschnitt. Das Strafgesetz, in A.
ScHONKE & H. SCHR6DER, STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR 56-85, §§ 3-7 (T.
Lenckner, A. Eser, P. Cramer & W. Stree 23d ed. 1988); Eser, Die Entwicklung des

internationalen Strafrechts im Lichte des Werkes von Hans-HeinrichJescheck, in 2
FESTSCHRIFr FOR HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK 1353-77 (1985); Jescheck, Gegenstand
und neueste Entwicklung des internationalenStrafrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR REINHART MAURACH 579 (1972).

153.
154.

Meyer, supra note 8, at 115.
Eser, supra note 3, at 119.

155. See Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the InternationalEnforcement of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 69 (1990).
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States law will in all situations accommodate extradition to a foreign
state having jurisdiction under the foreign state's law based on the nationality or active personality principle, the passive personality principle,
the protective principle, or the universality theory. Certainly in the arena
of terrorism and in circumstances in which the passive personality principle converges with policies relating to the universality and protective
principles, the notion of vicarious administration of justice may have a
viable analogue in United States law. Although many United States governmental officials do not understand the notion of jurisdiction based on
the refusal of extradition, prosecution for conduct arising in the United
States or in circumstances under which some United States theory of
jurisdiction would apply is more acceptable. This is true, even if the
impetus for prosecution is the refused request for extradition and a subsequent request to prosecute made by the foreign country. This is an
application of the principle aut dedere aut punire (or iudicare) and
should be acceptable under the expanding principles of jurisdiction in
United States law.
United States law relating to jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime
and extradition, especially that involving terrorist violence, is not as incompatible with the laws of Germany or other European states as many
commentators suggest. The nationality principle (active personality) is
not a primary basis of asserting jurisdiction under United States law, but
neither is it wholly anathema. The conjunction of the expanding nationality, protective principle, and universal jurisdictional bases in United
States law and the fact that the United States often does not require
reciprocity in the manner demanded under European law accommodates
many of the difficulties presented by the European commentators. Considering this rapprochement, it is uncertain whether the explicit development of a "new" doctrine denominated vicarious administration of justice
is necessary. Scholars, judges, and practitioners in the United States,
however, must study the notion of vicarious administration of justice and
its correlation and compatibility with extant principles under United
States law. Likewise, the European counterparts must do the same with
the expanding United States notions of jurisdiction over extraterritorial
crime.
Vicarious administration of justice, therefore, may be a notion of significant benefit. German criminal law applies in some instances to offenses committed outside Germany by foreigners as long as some theory
of jurisdiction, including vicarious administration of justice, addresses the
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conduct, and the conduct constitutes an offense under German law.1"'
German law apparently applies and Germany will prosecute when the
state in which the criminal conduct occurred does not request extradition, or if Germany denies extradition, or if extradition otherwise is not
feasible. 157 Principles similar to those of double criminality and the special use of double criminality appear to be at work in the notion of vicarious administration of justice.
For punishment to occur in Germany, the conduct must be punishable
by the law of the state where the conduct occurred, unless no criminal
law enforcement exists in that state."' Moreover, the conduct must be of
the type that is usually (barring some technical blockage) extraditable
under a treaty or relevant law of each state for the particular offense
involved. Apparently, this indicates that the offense must not be of a
to incur sufficient punishpolitical nature" 9 and must be grave enough
1 60
ment in each state to make it extraditable.
Vicarious administration of justice is subsidiary to extradition. It does
not apply unless a treaty or legally based bar to extradition arises in a
given case. In addition, even though German law applies to the prosecution and punishment, the punishment provided under the law of the state
where the conduct occurred cannot be exceeded. In other words, the parameters of punishment are controlled by the state where the offense
occurred. This accommodates notions of lgalitd (the requirement of no
punishment without a promulgated law) and the need for the conduct to
be proscribed in both places.
Vicarious administration of justice would resolve situations in which
one state would not be able to extradite. It seems, however, that the
concept of vicarious administration of justice already is functioning to a
significant degree. If a state refuses to extradite a national, it has the
obligation under international law, and probably under its own domestic
law, to seek prosecution of that person and impose appropriate punishment. An interesting difference between vicarious administration of justice and current United States law is that the former recognizes the limits in its application of criminal law, based on notions similar to double
criminality. Thus, it appears that prosecution of a fugitive pursuant to
extradition would require accommodation of the requested state's inter-

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
offenses

Meyer, supra note 8, at 115-16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. This is a double criminality approach; extradition being available only for
which give rise to a minimum level of punishment.
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ests and values. This works to diminish the size of the world in terms of
protection of rights. The principle of vicarious administration of justice
may make denial of extradition more palatable to states requesting it. Its
recognition also may prompt increased understanding and accommodation. The majority of the problems suggested as reasons for the doctrine's
inapplicability, however, appear to have been resolved. Thus, continued
discussion of the merits of vicarious administration of justice is important
to its full implementation.
V.

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS

This section operates under the European analytical predilection to
postulate in terms of principles.161 This analysis differs from many
United States approaches in which the underlying basics are discussed in
the context of a given current problem or theme of international law
enforcement, such as terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, or
drug trafficking. In each of these specific spheres, the underlying questions of law are reduced to the problems of dedere iudicare puniree 2 in
the sense of Grotius' still-valid distinction. 6 3
In principle, there are only two ways to resolve problems that arise in
a manner which interrelates the substantive and procedural penal law of
more than one state. First, a state can assert prescriptive jurisdiction,
even though the human behavior in question occurs outside the asserting
state. Grotius noted that this is part of the still-existing dichotomy of
national power and authority to punish a wrongdoer for transnational
conduct.'" The second principle involves one nation assisting other jurisdictions by means of mutual assistance in the largest sense. This includes
not only extradition or other forms of traditional mutual assistance, such
as letters rogatory, but also recognition of foreign judgments, transfer of
sentenced persons, and transfer of proceedings. This principle can be denominated dedere,6 5 as one state provides (gives) its assistance to another rather than creating or asserting its own jurisdiction.
The methods today are based on multiple national jurisdictions, and
other propositions currently are becoming prominent. Professor Bassiouni has promoted the idea of an international criminal tribunal to be
161.
162.
judicate,
163.
164.
165.

See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
These are the basic national tools of international law enforcement: deliver, adand punish.
See 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 151.

Id.
Dedere is from the latin verb "to give" or "to give back." Hence, to give assis-

tance or to extradite, in modern criminal procedure terms.
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established for the most important and serious international and transnational crimes.1 66 The conventional adoption of an international or regional criminal tribunal would be a significant new step in combatting
international crime. This would provide an independent organ on the
international level to prosecute international and transnational crime.
While there is significant interest in either an international tribunal or a
set of regional tribunals, the road to adoption may be long and difficult.
The prospect of these tribunal proposals raises significant questions,
such as, who would have prescriptive jurisdiction? Would all states be
bound by a mere majority of these states? What about the minority that
did not agree? Of course, these are questions that public international
law has contemplated from its inception. Creating supranational 6 7 substantive norms of criminal law, enforced by a supranational organ, however, is a significant initiative that could create intensive interference
with national entities and with individuals through international law.
Thus, the significant new developments in emerging international law
and practice need to be scrutinized. This type of tribunal or tribunal
system should function on the basis of a substantive code of *offenses
promulgated by the member states in an organic convention.'6 8 The ju-

166. INSTrrUTo SUPERIORE INTERNAZIONALE DE SCIENZE CRIMINALi, Draft Statute, InternationalCriminal Tribunal, Committee of Experts on InternationalCriminal
Policyfor the Prevention and Control of Transnationaland International Criminality
andfor the Establishmentof an InternationalCriminal Court, Organized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Under the Auspices of the
Italian Ministry of Justice, in Cooperation with The United Nations Crime Prevention
& Criminal Justice Branch (C. Blakesley, Rapporteur, June 1990) (drafts and analysis
may be found in 62 REVUE INT'L DE DROrr PENAL (1991)) [hereinafter Draft Statute];
M. BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987).
167. These questions also are addressed in The Analysis of the Proposed International Criminal Court in Draft Statute, supra note 166. There is a differentiation of the
three levels of international criminal law: national, international (national criminal law
influenced by treaty obligations as well as interstate cooperation), and supra-national
(criminal law existing "above" national states; e.g., on the level of the United Nations, or
relating to general principles that have taken on the nature of ius cogens). See Eser,
Basic Issues Concerning Transnational Cooperation in Criminal Cases: A Problem in
Outline, in Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 15-18 Eighth United Nations Congress in Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, U.N.-Doc., A/Conf. 144/G/
Federal Republic of Germany, July 1990 (English translation); see also Information: La
Cooperation Internationale dans le Domaine de la Prevention du Crime et de la Justice
PNnal au XXI 6 Siecle, VIII Eme Congrts des Nations Unies pour la pr vention du
crime et le traitement des dtlinquants, La Havane (Cuba), 27 aofit-7 septembre 1990,
77 Revue de Droit P~nal et de Criminologie 253 (Belg. 1991).
168. Further questions remain regarding such a tribunal: What sort of trial would
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risdiction of any tribunal should include all international crimes, as defined by current international conventions, or jurisdiction could be limited to terroristic offenses and narcotics trafficking. Any list of offenses
ought to be based on currently existing international conventions, but the
substantive elements of the crimes would have to be provided explicitly.
A convention creating an international criminal court could provide a
listing of the offenses subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In effect,
this would provide an international criminal code. The relationship between such an international tribunal and national courts and
prosecutorial offices, however, is uncertain. The relationship should be
based on cooperation and collaboration between the tribunal and the various party-states. The tribunal would not replace domestic prosecutorial
or judicial prerogative, but rather would be an additional forum to be
utilized if desired. If it is not possible to draft an entire international
penal code, the notion of transfer of criminal proceedings would allow
prosecution based on the substantive law of the transferring state. The
court could interpret the law in such a case in the manner it believed the
domestic courts of the transferring state would act.
Even if such an international tribunal were to be developed, ordinary
domestic offenses involving international substantive or procedural issues
still would be left to national systems. Furthermore, the tribunal itself
would be a possible conduit for international cooperation. Thus, questions of jurisdiction and extradition, as well as other forms of mutual
assistance, would remain important. Moreover, an international tribunal
based on cooperation and the further development of domestic criminal
justice systems would enhance their domestic ability to function in relation to transnational crime. The tribunal would facilitate cooperation
and coordination of nations in matters of international criminal justice.
Thus, even if an international criminal tribunal were to be adopted, the
need for understanding the principles of jurisdiction, extradition, and
other forms of mutual assistance would continue.
In conceptualizing the relationship between punire and dedere in the
international context, this Article now will consider two basic situations.16 9 The first situation, in which only one state proscribes certain
specific conduct as criminal, poses the problem of determining under
the accused have? Will there be a jury? If so, what role would it have? Will the trial be
adversarial or not so adversarial? Will proof beyond a reasonable doubt be required?

Will there be cross examination by defense counsel? What rules of evidence will apply?
These questions are also addressed in Draft Statute, supra note 166.
169. See also Lagodny, Grundkonstellationen des internationalenStrafrechts, 101
ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 987-1011 (1989).
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what conditions the promulgating state appropriately may implement the
prescription by punishing the offender. The second situation, in which
more than one promulgating nation proscribes the conduct, presents the
problem of determining which state appropriately may punish the
offender.
A.

The First Situation: When Only One State Proscribes a Given
Human Behavior

It is helpful in clarifying the various possibilities involved with this
situation to distinguish two separate groups of norms.17 0 The first relates
to a determination of how criminal conduct, regardless of where the conduct occurred or where it had its effect, should be punished.' 7 1 The second deals with the conditions that subject extraterritorial conduct to the
state's substantive law. Punishment of acts committed extraterritorially
requires the presence of a special connecting factor, such as the need to
protect certain domestic1 7 2 or international legal interests.' 73 Under German law, these connecting factors are listed in sections 3 through 7 and 9
of the GPO.1 7 ' Only by combining both groups of norms can one make a
determination whether a given behavior is punishable under the domestic
substantive law. These distinctions may clarify the appropriate resolution of different problems that arise when either the suspect or the
means of developing evidence'"5 are outside the territory, of the state that
has criminalized the behavior.
This section considers three possible circumstances in which only one
state proscribes a particular behavior. The first is when a state other
170. This Article attempts to apply neutral nomenclature to escape the debate over
whether these questions are based essentially in procedural or substantive law.
171. Under United States criminal law, this group includes offenses, defenses, and
sentencing rules. According to the European paradigm, this group consists mainly of
offenses, grounds of justification, and excuse. See, e.g., A. ESER & G. FLETCHER,
RECHTFERTIGUNG UND ENTSCHULDIGUNG (dealing with this differentiation and norms
concerning sentencing). United States law does not expressly make a differentiation in
this manner.

172. Important domestic interests are threatened by planning a war of aggression,
treason, endangering external security, abduction, and casting political suspicion on one
domiciled or customarily residing within Germany.
173. Important international interests are threatened by crimes involving atomic energy, attacks on air traffic, unauthorized dealings in narcotics, dissemination of pornography, encouraging prostitution, counterfeiting, and economic subsidy fraud.
174. See 28 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 48-51 (1987).
175. The basic notions presented may be applied equally to extradition or other
forms of mutual assistance.
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than the asserting state proscribes the conduct, but lacks extraterritorial
range. The second is when other states do not proscribe that particular
conduct. The third is when behavior is not proscribed as such in the state
on whose territory the conduct occurred, but is proscribed extraterritorially by the law of another state.
1. When the Law of Other States Lacks Extraterritorial Range: Abolition of Traditional Bars to Extradition
The following situation is an example of when a state's laws lack extraterritorial range: A German citizen kills another German citizen in
Germany, without impacting the interests of any foreign state. If the
offender escapes to the United States, it would not be possible to punish
,him in the United States because United States law does not cover such
circumstances.1 " 6 In this situation, German officials have three potential
courses of action.
a.

Inappropriate Solutions

German officials could act inappropriately by prosecuting the person
in absentia or by abducting him and then prosecuting. This, however, is
unlawful under German constitutional law. It also violates the European
Convention on Human Rights and international law in general
and is
1 77
not considered a legal means of international law enforcement.
b.

Transfer of Proceedings

Another possibility of resolving the problem is for the state where the
offense occurred to transfer the proceedings to the other state. The states
of the Council of Europe agreed in the European Convention on the
Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters1 7

to transfer the responsi-

bility for prosecution in such a situation from the state in which the
charges have been brought to the other state.1 79 Essentially, one state
waives its right to prosecute in favor of allowing another to do so. This
Convention has been ratified only by Austria, Denmark, the Nether176. See supra Part II.
177. See C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2; Abramovsky, supra note 15, at 122.
178. Europ. T.S. No. 73 May 15, 1972.
179.

See 6 M.

ONER TRANSFER

ABBELL &

B.

RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: PRIS-

117 (1990) (Part XV, Other Forms of International Judicial Assis-

tance in Criminal Matters, ch. 1, International Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal

Matters); Schutte, Transfer of Criminal Proceedings: The European System, in 2
319 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
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lands, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey, and therefore is limited in application. It provides, however, an interesting paradigm for future cooperation. Currently, the most important method of resolving this problem is
by way of extradition.
c.

Extradition

The use of extradition depends on the substantive conditions required
either by legislation or treaty."' 0 Traditional bars to extradition include
the political offense exception, lack of reciprocity,"8 1 the rule of extraditable offenses,1 82 and the non-extradition of nationals.1 8 ' Although the
political offense exception does not have great impact on extradition, the
other three frequently bar extradition, especially in Europe. Therefore,
it is very important to analyze whether these exceptions may be abolished without damaging any protection of civil liberty or human rights.
Historically, the traditional bars to extradition were created and functioned for the benefit of the states concerned.' 8 The individual sought
for extradition benefited, if at all, only incidentally to the state's protection of its sovereign interests. The fugitive in the requested state was not
considered a subject of international law and therefore possessed no individual rights.1 85 The individual was considered an object transported
from one state to the other as an exercise of the sovereign will of the two
states involved. This archaic vision of international law is now moribund, as is evidenced by the creation of new, human rights-based, indi-

180. United States law prohibits extradition, except when it is mandated by a treaty
between the requesting state and the United States. Most European states, including the
United Kingdom, allow extradition in the absence of a treaty if the prerequisites of the
relevant national extradition laws are met. See C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
181. Reciprocity is not the bar to extradition under United States law that it is under
European laws. Id. at ch. 4; see also supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
182. The rule of extraditability provides that only offenses that are made explicitly
extraditable are extraditable.
183. The rule of double criminality plays no role in this, but plays a very important
one in the second group.
184. See Lagodny, Die Rechtsstellung des Auszuliefernden in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, 9 BEITRAEGE UND MATERIALIEN AUS DEM MAX PLANCK INSTITUT FOfR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT § 3, at 27-62 (1987); C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 4; Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition From Antiquity to
Modern Franceand the United States: A BriefHistory, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rv.
39 (1981).
185. Cf. United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986) (The rule of
specialty is a right belonging to a state party to an extradition treaty; the fugitive has no
standing to raise it. Moreover, when fugitive "waives" extradition, or is returned by way
of comity, the rule of specialty and other protections do not apply.).
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vidual-oriented, bars to extradition. 186
Even if individual rights did not play an important role in the creation
of the traditional bars to extradition, the creators of these bars were motivated by concerns of protections for the individual. If individual civil
liberty interests motivate the traditional bars to extradition, they cannot
be abolished unless the individual rights were abolished or altered, something that is neither helpful nor desirable. If, on the other hand, these
civil liberty interests were solely state-oriented and did not protect the
individual fugitive, states simply might agree to eliminate them as a
means of facilitating extradition.187 If they were eliminated, it would still
be necessary, of course, to protect individual basic rights by incorporating these rights, as bars to extradition in their own right. In Europe,
states currently are taking legislative steps to protect basic human rights
in the extradition setting, which is evidence that these concerns and ideas
are not purely theoretical.1 8 ' The Schengen Treaties of 1985 and 1990,
entered into by Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands, shall-as a model for the other states of the Common Market-create open frontiers among the parties.1 89 This model, and the developments arising from the notion of a "unified Europe," contemplate
the abolishment of traditional state-based principles of extradition as a
means to facilitate international cooperation in criminal matters.

186.

See, e.g., 1979

AUSLIEFERUNGS UND RECHTSCHILFEGESETZ; BUNDESGESETZ-

BLATT FOR DIE REPUBLIK OSTERREICH, No. 529 (1979) (Austria); 1982 BUNDESGESETZ
OBER INTERNATIONALE RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFSACHEN, SAMMLUNG DER EIDGEN6S-

sscHEN GESETZE 846 (1982) (Switzerland); CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE arts. 697-

726 (1988) (Italy). This trend is evident in recent extradition legislation in which states
have formulated new bars to extradition that are individual-oriented and based closely on
the European Convention on Human Rights, The Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human Rights].
187. The elimination of the political offense exception may implicate domestic
problems related to the separation of powers and raise questions about the judicial role in
protecting domestic civil liberties. This goes beyond the protection of the individual fugitive and is systemic under United States constitutional criminal justice. See Blakesley,
supra note 81, at 471, 513-29; Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1986); contra Lubet, Extradition Unbound: A Reply to ProfessorsBlakesley and Bassiouni, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 47
(1989); Lubet, InternationalCriminal Law and the "Ice-Nine" Error:A Discourse on
the Fallacy of Universal Solutions, 28 VA. J. IN'L L. 963 (1988).
188. See supra note 186; see also infra notes 206-213 and accompanying text.

189. Schengen I Treaty, 5

GEMEINSAMES

MINISTERIALBLATT

79-81 (1986);

Schengen II Treaty, not yet ratified, and not yet published officially (signed copy treaty
available in the offices of the Max-Planck-Institut ffir Auslandisches und Internationales
Strafrecht, Freiburg, Federal Republic of Germany).
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With regard to basic individual rights, it is useful to analyze the specific pattern of basic rights in the German Constitution, as far as those
rights function as rights against public acts and influence (Abwehrrechte).190 First, such analysis must focus on whether a given act of public authority, such as the surrender of an individual fugitive to another
state pursuant to an extradition request, touches the scope of a basic
right. Surrender in extradition always touches on the basic right of liberty, because the requested state forces the extraditee to travel to the
requested state. If a basic right is infringed upon, the next step is to
determine whether Parliament has promulgated a law on extradition or
judicial assistance or has ratified an extradition treaty. If such parliamentary action exists, analysis of the constitutionality of the parliamentary infringement must proceed.
In a manner similar to substantive due process balancing of interests,
one must analyze whether the application of the infringing law upon the
basic right meets the limitations on the promotion of the public interest,
such as the principle of proportionality (Verhaeltnismaessigkeitsprinzip).
The principle of proportionality provides that the nucleus of the basic
rights may not be infringed upon. Further, even infringement that does
not reach the core of the right is not allowed, unless no other means exist
to achieve the protection of the public interest with a lesser impact onthe
individual basic right.""1
d.

Reciprocity

Reciprocity concerns only state-interests. An individual's rights are
neither touched nor violated if the requested state refuses to extradite
without reciprocity in a similar case. Therefore, the doctrine of reciprocity might be abolished, at least from the point of view of individual interests. United States law has long held reciprocity in extradition to be of
lesser significance.
e.

Political Offense Exception

The political offense exception is a mysterious and controversial composition of very different interests. It generally appears to be a "blackbox" for cases in which the requested state wants neither to extradite nor
190. See A.

BLECKMANN, STAATSRECHT

II:

ALLGEMEINE GRUNDRECHTSLEHREN

263-308 (1985).
191.

For details, see

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-

MANY-EsSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW WITH A
TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW (U. Karpen ed. 1988).
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reveal the actual grounds for the refusal. Individual rights on the level of
German constitutional law do not require the exception as such; therefore, the political offense exception could be abolished from the German
point of view.192 From a United States constitutional perspective, the political offense exception may be a repository for protecting civil liberties.
Therefore, if it were replaced, other means would be required to provide
the same protection. 93 Germany has developed a mechanism for eliminating the statist-based aspects of the political offense exception without
eroding protections for the individual. At the same time, the mechanism
also maintains the separation of power value, which in the United States
currently is reposited in the political offense exception. Thus, the other
means of protection are the Basic Rights clauses themselves.1 4
In future extradition treaties entered into by Germany, Basic Rights
clauses containing human rights based protections will be mandatory
from the German constitutional or Basic Rights point of view. Otherwise, such a treaty would be contrary to the German Constitution. In the
absence of a treaty provision, the Constitutional basic rights are directly
applicable (Grundgesetz). Abolishing the political offense exception,
therefore, only would set aside that particular, statist-based bar to extradition, without involving the individual interests that otherwise might
have been reposited behind that bar. The political offense exception is
not necessary to bar the extradition of a person who risks facing an unfair trial, torture, or inappropriate sanctions such as the death penalty,
because the Basic Rights protect against these actions. 95 A separate issue
is whether the requested state should be allowed to refuse extradition in
a case in which human rights violations are not in question, but rather
the requested state does not support the requesting state politically. This
falls under the traditional political offense exception clause. Such a polit192.

See C. VAN

TRADITION

DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EX(1990); Lagodny, supra note 35, at 583; Lagodny, The Abolition and Re-

placement of the Political Offence Exception: Prohibited by Internationalor Domestic
Law?, 19 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 317 (1989); see also Stein, Die Auslieferungsausnahme bei politischen Delikten, in 82 BEITRAEGE UND MATERIAUIEN ZUM AUSLANDISCHEN OEFFENTLiCHEN RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT (1983).

193. See C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at chs. 2, 3, 4.
194. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
195. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted
in 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 439 (1989), reprinted in 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1963
(1989); Breitenmoser & Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11
MICH. J. INT'L L. 845 (1990); Williams, Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription
and the Death Sentence as Bases for Refusing Extradition (paper presented at the International Seminar on Extradition, Dec. 4-9, 1989, organized by the Instituto Superiore
Internazionale de Scienze Criminali, Siracusa, Italy) (publication forthcoming).
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ical interest more clearly involves the traditional "state interest clause"
in which extradition may be refused if the requested state declares that
the surrender of the fugitive would be contrary to its essential national
interests.1 06
f. Rule of Extraditable Offenses
The rule of extraditable offenses, although primarily established for
states to avoid commencing expensive extradition procedure involving
minor offenses, has a counterpart in the basic principle of proportionality. 117 Proportionality requires that the significant liberty infringement
caused by extradition be allowed only for serious offenses. Therefore, a
clause providing for extradition only in cases of a certain gravity must be
contained in extradition treaties.
g.

Non-extradition of Nationals

The non-extradition of nationals is a long-standing principle that has
become a part of the domestic legal fabric in European states and is a
Basic Right in the German Constitution." 8 This principle is equally
strong in most other European states.1 9 In the Netherlands, however,
the rule was amended, even though the non-extradition of nationals was
prohibited as a constitutional principle. The amended Constitution allows the Dutch Government to extradite Dutch nationals to another
state for prosecution and sentencing with the condition that the national
be returned to the Netherlands for enforcement of the judgment.20 0 This
example is a possible indication that the notion of non-extradition of
nationals has lost some of its sacrosanct aura, at least within the framework of the European system.
In the long run, it may be wise to reduce or eliminate some of these
substantive bars to extradition. This would facilitate extradition significantly and would benefit the international regime of cooperation in matters of international criminal law. Such a reduction or elimination of
substantive bars to extradition would have to, at the same time, ensure
protection of human rights and civil liberty.
The new dimension of protecting individual rights creates new imped-

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Stein, supra note 192, at 367, 380.
For a discussion of proportionality, see supra text accompanying note 191.
Article 16 provides: "No German may be extradited to a foreign country."
See supra Part II.
Staatsblad 1988, No. S. 478.
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iments to extradition."' The recent landmark European Court of
Human Rights decision in Soering v. United Kingdom20 2 has caused
much discussion in Europe and the United States.20 3 In this case, Soering was charged with murder in Virginia. He subsequently was arrested
in the United Kingdom pursuant to an extradition request by the United
States. The European Court pronounced that extradition by the United
Kingdom to the United States would constitute "inhuman treatment" in
violation of article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention), 204 because Soering
would be subject to the death penalty and face sitting on death row for
years.2 05 The most important feature of the decision is that a requested
state which is a member of the European Convention on Human Rights
is responsible for what happens to the extraditee in the requesting state.
This responsibility stems from the obligations under the Convention to
promote the protection of the individual. Eventually, the United Kingdom extradited Soering to Virginia after the attorney general promised
that he would not seek the death penalty. The Court noted that not
every right under the Convention necessarily would bar extradition. The
Court, however, decided the case only in the context of article 3. Thus,
the question remains whether other protections, such as the "fair trial"
guarantees of article 6, also would bar extradition.
Soering will have direct impact on the interpretation of the Grundgesetz, because the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany held that, in

201. Van den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to
Extradition: Opening Pandora'sBox?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 757 (1990).
202. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 11
Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 439 (1989), reprinted in 28 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1063
(1989); see also 16 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 314 (1989); NEUE
2183-85; Breitenmoser & Wilms, supra note 195, at

JURISTISCHE WocHENscr-irT

845; Williams, supra note 195.
203. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 201; Breitenmoser & Wilms, supra note 195, at
845.
204. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 186. Article 3
provides: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."
205. The Court did not directly consider the dilemma it would face if courts in the
United States were to decide that the death penalty would be imposed quickly. The
Court, however, rejected the argument that the long delay on death row is caused by the
accused himself because of the substantial number of appeals taken: "[n]evertheless, just
as some lapse of time between sentence and execution is inevitable if appeal safeguards
are to be provided to the condemned person, so it is equally part of human nature that
the person will cling to life by exploiting those safeguards to the full." Soering Case,
supra note 195, at 42.
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interpreting the Grundgesetz law, courts must consider the contents and
development of the European Convention of Human Rights.206 This requirement indicates that the German Constitutional Court considers that
the European Court of Human Rights is a persuasive source of law and
serves as a means of interpretation of the contents of the scope of German Basic Rights.207 Thus, Soering should strengthen a new trend in
German discussion on the scope of Basic Rights. The recent trend,
strengthened by Soering, is that courts must interpret German Basic
Law expansively as a bar to extradition.2 03 This is in contrast to the
previous principle argument that only German Basic Rights under article 16, the non-extradition of nationals and the subjective right of asylum, could be legal obstacles to extradition.209 The question now is not
whether German Basic Rights have any function at all in extradition,
210
but whether courts will interpret the range of Basic Human Rights
211 or narrowly. 212
broadly
Analysis of individual rights in the context of extradition focuses on
two approaches. The first approach is a positive one in the sense that
most of the traditional barriers to extradition may be abolished. The second approach is a negative one that contemplates new bars which are not
dependent on a treaty or legislation, because they are of a constitutional
order and character. 213 The constitutional character of these Basic Rights
206. See 74 DEcisioNs OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 358, 370
(1987).
207. Id.
208. See Lagodny, Grundrechte als Auslieferungs-Gegenrechte, 41 NEUE JURIsTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT

2146-50 (1988).

209. See Vogler, Walter & Wilkitzki, Kommentar zum Gesetz Ueber internationale
Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, in H. GRUETZNER & P. POETZ, INTERNATIONALER RECrSHILFEVERKEHR IN STRAFSACHEN § 8 (2d ed. 1980).
210, For a discussion of these problems, see Note, Extradition Reform: The Role of
the Judiciary in Protecting the Rights of a Requested Individual, 9 B.C. IN'r'L &
COMP. L. REV. 293, 322 (1986) (describing how the United States view is
"proceduralized").
211. See Lagodny, supra note 184, at 161-257. Basic Rights are widely applicable
because the consequences of extradition that occur in the requesting state after extradition are relevant and have a significant impact on the individual's basic rights. Thus, if
Germany is the requested state, Germany is responsible for what happens in the requesting state because of Germany's responsibility under the Convention for Human Rights
and the German Basic Law. Germany, therefore, must analyze the likelihood of a fair
trial in the requested state, the risk of death that the extraditee faces, not only of the
death penalty, but also prison conditions that are dangerous to the fugitive's life.
212. See 75 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 1, 14-18 (1987)
(providing that only a nucleus of Basic Rights are applicable in the field of extradition).
213. The consequence of this is that extradition treaties of Germany, in the future,
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is similar to that of mandatory norms, which must be part of every interpretation of any relevant clause in an extradition treaty or extradition
law. In addition, ambiguous sections must be interpreted so as to promote the Basic Rights, just as gaps should be filled also to promote these
rights.
2. When Other States Do Not Proscribe the Particular Kind of Behavior as Criminal: Should the Double Criminality Requirement be
Abolished?
If a United States citizen violates the insider trading laws of the
United States and then escapes to Germany, German law would not permit extradition to the United States, because insider trading has not been
made punishable under the German Criminal Code. In this hypothetical,
the double criminality requirement would be an obstacle to extradition,
which raises the question of whether this result necessitates the abrogation of the double criminality bar. At first glance, this hypothetical extradition would appear to be contrary to the principle nulla poena sine lege
(no punishment without law),21 a German Basic Right. From the European perspective, however, the act of extraditing or surrendering a fugitive is not viewed as punishment. Rather, it is seen only as assisting a
foreign state in its criminal procedure, which is realized by means of a
decision of the requested state's executive power.215 German Basic Law
does not require the application of the rule of double criminality for
extradition.2 16 Every extradition, however, affects rights under the Basic
might contain a clause providing that: "Extradition will not be granted, if it is contrary
to international and Constitutional Basic Rights, especially if the extraditee has to expect
214. The principle indicates that an individual cannot be punished unless the relevant conduct has already been criminalized.
215. From the German point of view, the fact that most extradition cases involve
arrest of the fugitive in order to certify that extradition can be effected does not involve
the double criminality requirement. Under German law, arrest does not require punishable behavior. Arrest may also serve other objectives, such as security or the realization of
deportation.
216. There is, of course, a long history of debate over the double criminality rule in
German literature. See Lagodny, supra note 184, at 48-50, 352-53; M6rsberger, Das
Prinzip der identischen Strafrechtsnorm im Auslieferungsrecht, 59 NEUE K6LNER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE ABHANDLUNGEN 4-21 (1969). Lagodny argues in favor of
Basic Rights and indicates that if the double criminality requirement is abrogated, no
justification would exist based on public interests, to interfere with Basic Rights. At the
time Lagodny wrote his material, the principle of Viflkerrechtsfreundlichkeit was not so
clearly developed as it is now. With the exception of Mbrsberger's short passage, German discussion has been similar to that in the United States in relation to double crimi-
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Law, and thus non-prohibition is not enough.217 A positive justification
for extradition without applying the double criminality principle is necessary. Because German Basic Law generally is friendly toward international law and international interests (the principle of Voelkerrechtsfreundlichkeit), the support of foreign interests is a general public
interest of sufficient order to justify a restriction of a Basic Right.21 8
Germany may make foreign interests "its own interests" to the same
extent as German criminal law may restrict German Basic Rights in
internal cases. Therefore, it is possible to restrict the Basic Right of article 2, paragraph 1, in favor of foreign criminal law and extradite the
fugitive accused of insider trading in the United States. This would appear initially to pose a significant civil liberties danger from a United
States point of view.
The German analysis, however, does not create unconditional support
with regard to the criminal law of the requesting state, because German
substantive criminal law remains a significant force. To the same extent
that German lawmakers are prevented from creating unconstitutional
criminal offenses, courts will deny extradition if the request concerns an
offense that is unconstitutional under German law. For example, punishment for editing an offensive newspaper is contrary to the right of
freedom of the press that is set forth in article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the Basic Law. Similarly, if the prescribed punishment itself violated Basic Rights against corporal or disproportionate punishment, German
courts also would deny extradition.
The maxim nulla poena sine lege is considered a Basic Right under
German constitutional law.2 19 There are three reasons, however, why
this rule from a German perspective is not seen by German law to be an
obstacle to the abolition of the double criminality requirement. First, extraditing a person to another state is not tantamount to a punishment.22 0
Second, the rule would not be an obstacle if the requested state has a law
providing for extradition, either on the basis of a treaty or domestic extradition legislation, that is ratified and full-fledged law.2 21 Third, the

nality. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
217. BASIc LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 2, para. 1.
218. See Bleckmann, Die Voelkerrechtsfreundlichkeit der deutschen Rechtsordnung,
32 DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 309-18 (1979).
219. BASic LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 103, para. 2: "An
act can be punished only if it was an offense against the law before the act was
committed."
220. Jescheck, Die internationaleRechtshilfe in Strafsachen in Europa, 66 ZErrSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 518, 531 (1954).
221. See Vogler, Aktuelle Probleme der Auslieferung, 81 ZErTSCHRIFT FOR DIE
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rule would not be an obstacle if the requesting state's law actually contains a law providing a criminal sanction for the act in question. The
relevant question in the German Basic Law in relation to extradition is
whether the requesting state's provision of criminal law would be constitutional if it were passed by the German legislature.
In the context of the insider trading hypothetical, such conduct probably could be made criminal in Germany without interfering with any of
the Basic Rights.222 Insider trading is not something that is inherently
non-punishable or something for which the Basic Law would prohibit
punishment. If the conduct could be made punishable, there is no constitutional reason for Germany not to extradite. Thus, there is no constitutional reason to retain the rule of double criminality. Additionally, in the
absence of the double criminality principle, extradition to the United
States also would not violate German Basic Rights. At least for the purposes of extradition, states can operate with different definitions of offenses as long as the basic values of the state are not impugned. Another
benefit of abolishing the principle of double criminality is that the need
to harmonize existing criminal codes around the world would be reduced
significantly. This benefit, however, is a major theoretical stumbling
block to United States acceptance of an abrogation of the principle.
From the United States point of view, the abolition of double criminality is problematic. Although extradition is not the equivalent of punishment, it is a deprivation of liberty. Extradition, while considered an
aspect of judicial cooperation, does implicate fundamental rights under
the United States Constitution. It infringes more on a fugitive's liberty
than a simple arrest, and therefore ought to implicate more constitutional
protection. Extradition essentially is turning a person over for trial,
which, in the United States, requires sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause that the fugitive committed the crime. It also requires,
however, judicial recognition that the conduct triggering United States
participation in the deprivation of liberty be criminal under United
States law. The United States judicial system ought not participate in the
arrest, jailing, and sending of a person to be prosecuted in another state
on conduct that the United States has not rendered criminal. 223 Never-

GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT

222.

163, 170 (1969).

See BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 9/1338, 36-37 (German legislator discussing the

rule of double criminality, in the law of 1982, Gesetz iber die internationaleRechtshilfe
in Strafsachen. He noted that it would be neither contrary to the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) nor unjust to abolish the double criminality provision).
223. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441,
1443-47, 1459-62 (1988).
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theless, it appears that recent developments in United States case law on
the subject functionally have obliterated and abrogated the rule of double
criminality, by emphasizing the action constituting the offense rather
than its denomination and requiring only similarity, rendering its formal
abrogation.

2 24

This is not propitious from the United States point of view of civil
liberty. The principle of double criminality, based on the long-standing
maxim nulla poena sina lege, requires that a fugitive be extradited only
for conduct that is criminal in and punishable sufficiently by the domestic law of both states.225 Although virtually all United States extradition
treaties contain a dual criminality clause, some commentators 22 6 recently
have disparaged the principle, and judges often have limited it to near
' 7 that it
meaninglessness. Although many argue22
is an important principle in extradition law because of the sharp divergences among the criminal laws of the various states of the world, courts have been reluctant to
become comparativists. Critics argue 228 that it is an onerous burden on
the requested state's judiciary to determine the criminality of the act in
the requesting state's law. In reality, there is no such burden on the
court, as the rule is satisfied if the requesting state submits, along with
the rest of its evidentiary documentation, an affidavit of relevant law containing the statute that renders the action in question criminal. Thus,

224. United States courts recently have taken an almost casual approach to double
criminality, determining that extradition treaties are to be "liberally construed . . . to
effect.., the surrender of fugitives," and that double criminality is satisfied if the offense
charged is "substantially similar" in the law of the requesting and requested states. Id. at
1460-62; see also United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 893-94 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Theron
v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wiebe,
733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984); Brauch v. Raich, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980)
("substantially analogous"); Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1984)
(conduct, "in nature of extorting," "similar"); In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058,
1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("substantially similar"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 27,
§ 476(c).
225. See 2 M. BAssIouNi, supra note 24, at 324 (discussing the interrelationship of
dual criminality and reciprocity) (citing In re Nikoloff, 7 Ann. Dig. 351, 352 (Germany,
Upper Court of Dresden 1933), which stated: "Extradition would be granted upon the
principle of reciprocity and upon that of identity of extradition and prosecution, which
by the way is a universally recognized principle of international law."); In re Bachofner,
28 I.L.R. 322 (Colom. Supreme Court of Justice 1959); In re Zahabian, 32 I.L.R. 290
(Switz. Federal Tribunal 1963).
226. See, e.g., R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 20, at 415-16; I. SHEARER, supra
note 35, at 138-39.
227. See C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 4; Kester, supra note 223, at 1460-61.
228. See I. SHEARER, supra note 35, at 138-39; DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, TRArIT
ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 872 (2d ed. 1943).
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counsel should be familiar with foreign law or find an expert who is and
should plan a strategy that will cause the court to listen to and understand the difference in foreign criminal law.2 29 Taking these steps is
worthwhile because they significantly diminish the possibility of spurious
extradition requests.
The terminology used in denominating similar criminal conduct varies
greatly from state to state. Language and tradition significantly influence
the development of code phrasing such that it has become necessary to
include a clause in extradition treaties explicitly stating that the conduct
underlying the enumerated offenses, not the formal denomination, is determinative of extraditability. The United States position has been that
"whatever its denomination, if the facts of the particular case make out
an offense under the treaty, extradition should be granted. '230 Moreover,
as the United States Supreme Court held, "if a treaty fairly admits of
two constructions, one restricting the [state's] rights which may be
claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction
2 32 the
is to be preferred."' 23 1 In a subsequent case, Gallina v. Fraser,
United States Government extradited a fugitive by looking to the documentation and evidence to determine extraditability when the language
of the request was confusing. In this case, Italy had requested the extradition of the fugitive for "continuous," "aggravated," and "reiterated"
robbery. The United States District Court, after examining the record,
found that the words described circumstances involving a robbery or series of robberies and, therefore, warranted extradition under the Italian
23 8
Penal Code.
Mail and wire fraud 23 4 and transportation offenses2 35 currently are

229. See Kester, supra note 223, at 1460-61.
230. Letter From Acting Legal Adviser Meeker to Assistant Attorney General
Miller, Department of State (June 6, 1961) (discussing the extradition of Marcos Pfrez
Jimtnez, former President of Venezuela), reprinted in 6 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 764-66 (1968).
231. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933).
232. 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959).
233. Id. at 866-67.
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
235. Kester, supra note 223, at 1462-63. "Transportation offenses" are those acts
made criminal under United States federal law, having as a necessary element, in addition to the substantive elements of the particular offense, the transporting or transferring
across state or foreign borders of persons, articles, or other items related to the offense.
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution provides the authority for federal
jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction must be established in this or some other manner, or the
result would be a quagmire of competing jurisdictions. Furthermore, many of the "transportation offenses" involve organized crime, thus, making the funding, expertise, and
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high on the extradition priority list and have caused significant dual
criminality problems, because often no direct foreign counterpart exists.
These problems are exacerbated by the recent broad construction in
United States courts, which do not require actual fraud, but only mailing
2 36
or wiring a transmission in "furtherance of a scheme to defraud.1
Some courts have denied United States extradition requests on the basis of dual criminality.2 37 Over the years, many extradition requests
made by the United States to foreign governments have been denied because the foreign judge hearing the case could find no crime within state
law, such as "theft in interstate commerce." Recently, in a case in which
a fugitive was extradited to the United States from Great Britain, it was
argued that indicting after extradition was invalid on evidentiary
grounds.2 38
Double criminality poses additional problems for extradition when
courts read the rule as requiring common denomination of the conduct
rather than the common criminalization of the particular act or behavior.
Today, most United States courts understand that the conduct itself controls dual criminality. 2 0 United States courts recently have taken an almost casual approach to double criminality, determining that extradition

larger investigative and prosecutorial capabilities of the federal system more important.
236. Id. (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (mail fraud requires
only a scheme, plus mailing in furtherance)).
237. Id.; In re Lamar, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 701 (Alta. S. Ct.) (denial of extradition for
violation of the securities laws when the conduct did not constitute a crime under Canadian law).
238. The Circuit Court of Appeals rendered the indictment invalid,
because "the English magistrate did not find sufficient evidence to extradite for a
single charge in the indictment." (citation ommitted) In other words, Sensi claims
the United States could not try him for mail fraud or interstate transportation of
stolen property unless the British magistrate found sufficient evidence to commit
him for trial on those exact charges [combining the rule of specialty and double
criminality] ...
This interpretation yields a startling, and incorrect, conclusion. Under Sensi's
reading of the Treaty, a person extradited from the United Kingdom upon a British magistrate's finding that he stole money by means of the United States mails
could not be prosecuted on mail fraud charges, because under United States law it
is possible to commit mail fraud without successfully stealing anything, while in
the United Kingdom the crime of theft requires that the defendant succeed in taking something from someone else.
United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 893-94 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
239. "The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the
two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall be coextensive, or, in
other respects, the same in the two countries." Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312
(1922).
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treaties are to be "liberally construed

. . .

to effect

. . .

the surrender of

' 0
fugitives." 24

Further, courts have stated that double criminality is satisfied if the offense charged is "substantially similar" in the law of the
requesting and requested states. 241 Lately, courts have required only that
the offense charged for which extradition is sought be a serious crime in
both states.2 42
The principle of double criminality historically has been outcome determinative.24 3 Most recent treaties have added a double criminality provision 244 or a clause that allows extradition on a pure dual criminality
basis such that extradition is allowed for any conduct criminalized to a
certain degree by each state.2 45 Although these general clauses resolve
some difficulties in interpretation, they also have diminished the principle's intended protective effect.24 6

240. United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Valentine
v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1939); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933).
241. See Kester, supra note 223, at 1462; Theron v. United States Marshal, 832
F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1987); Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 79-80 (2d Cir.
1984) (conduct, "in nature of extortion;" "similar"); Brauch v. Raich, 618 F.2d 843, 847
(1st Cir. 1980) ("substantially analogous"); In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058,
1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("substantially similar").
242. Defendants have argued, for example, that since the offense charged may be
punished in the United States, even if there is no theft involved, the accused may not be
extradited (or, if extradited, not prosecuted) for that offense, when the requested country's law requires theft. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected the argument: "[The defendant's] alleged offense was stealing; the significance of his use of the mails and of interstate transportation and facilities is 'jurisdictional only' in that it permits him to be prosecuted under federal law." Sensi, 879 F.2d
at 893, 894; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 27, § 476(c).
243. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 300 (1933); see also Collins v.
Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311 (1922); Kelley v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6 (1915); Pettit v. Walshe,
194 U.S. 205, 217 (1904).
244. "Extradition shall be granted for the following acts if they are punished as
crimes or offenses by the laws of both states." See 1970 Supplementary Convention,
supra note 26, art. II.
245. See Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and Ireland, art. II,
T.I.A.S. No. 10813 (1983); Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and Italy,
art. II, T.I.A.S. No. 10837 (1983); Supplementary Extradition Convention Between the
United States and Sweden, art. II, T.I.A.S: No. 10812 (1983); 4 M. ABBELL & B. RisTAU, supra note 179, at 58 n.10.
246. The Swiss Government recently implemented the principle when it extradited
Adnan Kashoggi to the United States for certain charges, but refused to do so for his
alledged RICO violations, because Switzerland does not recognize RICO conduct as
criminal. United States v. Kashoggi, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2691 at 8 (Mar. 13, 1990).
The court stated:
Because of the terms of Kashoggi's extradition from Switzerland, he will not be
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Jurists outside the United States, however, now are becoming more
aware of and comfortable with the United States legal system, and the
State Department is drafting treaties in more general terms to promote
international accommodation. In United States v. Sensi, for example, the
British rejected the defendant's double criminality argument and extradited the fugitive.24 7 The district court noted that the British magistrate
found that the defendant's acts consisted of stealing, that this was a crime
in the United Kingdom, and that the double criminality rule was satisfied. The significance of the defendant's use of the mails and of interstate
transportation and facilities was understood to be "jurisdictional only,"
in that it permits him to be prosecuted under federal law.24 8 In cases like
these, the language often simply triggers the assertion of federal jurisdiction in cases particularly important for the federal government to prosecute, either because of the difficulty of state prosecution or the importance of the type of crime.2 49 On the other hand, the gravamen of some
federal crimes is the transportation itself. For example, interstate transportation of stolen property usually is not an extraditable offense, because the transportation of the property is the critical element of the
crime.2 50 If the foreign state does not have an equivalent offense, interstate transportation of stolen property would not be extraditable. Theft
from an interstate shipment, however, is extraditable because theft
clearly is the material part of the grievance. 251 Because the United States
judiciary has related the standards for what it considers "sufficiently
similar in crime" to satisfy the double criminality principles, most of the
problems have been eliminated that relate to the denial of extradition
under the rule of double criminality. Thus, the rule may not have to be
abrogated formally because recent cases already have eliminated it

tried for his alleged participation in the RICO enterprise and his obstructionist
activities in connection with the execution of a French Letter Rogatory. The Swiss
Government declined extradition on these charges because it does not recognize
RICO and the conduct constituting Kashoggi's alleged obstruction of justice in
connection with the execution of the Letter Rogatory occurred principally in
France. The Swiss officials found the extradition treaty to limit jurisdiction to
crimes committed within the territory of the United States.
247. 879 F.2d 888, 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
248. Id. at 894; In re Tan Yee Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (The
jurisdictional trigger for a federal crime did not bar crimes from being analogous to
Hong Kong crimes so as to bar extradition. Only a substantial similarity is required.).
249. See, e.g., United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1988) (in mailfraud case, the "use of the mails" is simply a jurisdictional element).
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988) (transportation of stolen goods, securities, monies,
fraudulent state tax stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting).
251. See, e.g., Sensi, 879 F.2d at 893-94.
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informally.2" 2

Another alternative to the abolition of the principle of double criminality is to create an offense that covers the particular behavior in question. In 1988, for example, Switzerland adopted Swiss Penal Code article 161 criminalizing insider trading.2 53 The Swiss Legislature's primary
motivation appears to have been to facilitate mutual assistance with the
United States. 2 " It is doubtful, however, that such a justification for creating a penal provision would be constitutional in Germany. If the
double criminality requirement causes problems in relation to a number
of states that have criminalized conduct not made criminal in Germany,
abrogating the rule of double criminality would infringe less upon Basic
Rights under German constitutionalism then would creating an offense
for purposes of cooperating with a foreign government.
3. When a Forum State's Criminal Law Does Not Proscribe Conduct
that Another State Proscribes and Provides for Extradition
If a foreign citizen were to disclose a national security secret of the
foreign government to a German magistrate when in Germany, the foreign citizen would not have violated German law, even though the citizen surely would have violated the law of the foreign state.2 5 The injured foreign state could assert jurisdiction on the basis of the protective
principle. 5 ' As long as the alleged perpetrator remained on German
soil, however, the foreign state would not be able to enforce its penal
prohibition. Nevertheless, extradition still might be possible unless it
2 57
were barred by the political offense exception.
German legal literature is unclear as to the special use of double criminality. Professor Vogler argues that for Germany, as the requested state,
to require an extraterritorial act under the requesting state's law also be
punishable as an extraterritorial act in Germany would be a "doctrinal
252. See id.; see also United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984);
supra note 27, § 476(c); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276, 293 (1933); Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309, 312 (1922); Kester, supra note 223, at 1460-61.
253. 1 SCHWEIZERIScHEs BUNDESBLATT 3 (1988).
254. 2 BOTSCHAFT DES BUNDESRATES 69 (1985).
255. Unless, of course, the other state has close relations with Germany and Germany criminalizes the divulging of the other state's secrets. Another example is if a state
applies the principles of passive personality without the requirement of the lex loci. See
supra Part IV; D. OEHLER, supra note 35, at 644, 707.
256. For a discussion of this principle, see C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2.
257. For a discussion of the political offense exception, see supra text accompanying
notes 192-96.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
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exaggeration." Vogler believes that this position ought to be rejected as a
matter of criminal law policy.25 8 Taking the opposite view, other authors

opine that the requested state must enforce its concepts concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction as an expression of justice. With reciprocity underlying the double criminality requirement, extradition can be approved
only when the jurisdictional law of the requested state would obtain in
obverse circumstances.2 5 9 If extraterritorial criminal prescriptive norms
were regarded as rules of substantive law, the consequence would be that
double criminality would include the special use of double criminality
requirements. This would require that the requested state also consider
the extraterritorial aspect of the conduct to be within its jurisdiction. 6 0
If they were considered as norms of procedural law, this consequence
would not necessarily have to be drawn. Thus, it would be possible not
to require that the requested state also consider the conduct proscribed if
committed extraterritorially. 6 1 In fact, only once has a German court
denied extradition because the extraterritorial offense, from the point of
view of the requested state, was not considered an extraterritorial
26 2

offense.

258.
259.

Vogler, Walter & Wilkitzki, supra note 209, § 3 n.17.
See Oehler, Aktuelle Probleme der Auslieferung, 81 ZEITSCHRIFT

GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT

216, at 98-99; see also K.

SCHWAIGHOFER, AUSLIEFERUNG

STRAFRECHT: EINE SYSTEMATISCHE DARSTELLUNG DES

Austrian

FOR DIE

142, 146-47 (1969); Marsberger, supra note
UND INTERNATIONALES

ARHG 96 (1988) (discussing

law); SCHULTZ, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE AUSLIEFERUNGSRECHT

331 (1954) (dis-

cussing
260.
261.
262.

Swiss law).
See Mdrsberger, supra note 216, at 95.
Id. at 97-98.
See Decision of the OberlandesgerichtStuttgart, 62 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 987-88 (1933); the OberlandesgerichtHdiiburg, in its Decision of 1931, did
not check whether German law allowed extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, although the case concerned a request from Yugoslavia to extradite a Yugoslavian national,

who had embezzled in Sacramento, California. 60 JuRmsTiscHE

WOCHENSCHRIFT

2874-

75. For judicial decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, see Eser &

Lagodny, InternationaleRechtshilfe in Strafsachen. Rechtsprechungssammlung 19491988, 15

BEITRAUGE UND MATERIALIEN AUS DEM MAX PLANCK INSTITUT FOR
LAUNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT.

Aus-

In a recent case, the OberlandesgerichtKarlsruhe stated that the requested state may,
in general, suppose that the requesting state has prescriptive jurisdiction. 38 Die Jus-

tiz-Amtsblatt des MinisteriumsftirJustiz, Bundes-und EuropaangelegenheitenBaden-Wilrttemberg, at 199 (1989). Only in cases of "evident doubt" (greifbare Zweifel)
might there be a review of this question by the requested state. In this case, the Court
held that there were no such "evident doubts." This is interesting considering that the
defendant was charged with being a member of a "criminal association" with central
units in Rome and Palermo, Italy. Italy requested extradition on charges that the fugitive
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The European Convention on Extradition specifically addresses extraterritorial prescription. Article 7 states that
[w]hen the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed
outside the territory of the requested Party, extradition may only be refused if the law of the requested Party does not allow prosecution for the
same category of offence when committed outside the latter Party's territory or does not allow extradition for the offence concerned.263
The framers inserted this provision in consideration of the law of states
that do not allow extradition for offenses committed outside their territory.2 6 4 The provision further provides that extradition must be granted
if the offense occurs outside of the requesting state's jurisdiction, unless
the requested state's laws do not authorize prosecution for the same offense when committed extraterritorially or do not otherwise authorize
extradition for the offense.2 15 German law has no such prohibition on

extradition,2 66 and therefore Germany would be obliged to extradite for
an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting state, even if
German law did not proscribe the same extraterritorial conduct. Under
German human rights law,26 7 courts should interpret the double criminality requirement in a restrictive manner, because it bars extradition in
cases in which no sufficient human rights basis exists.2"' Human rights
protections are protected directly and on their own account. The requested state, according to the logic of this approach, should be able to
extradite a fugitive, even though it has not established extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction over that type of conduct in its own laws. Thus,
the special use of double criminality ought not apply. The jurisdictional

allegedly committed crimes as an active member of the Mafia. There apparently were no
evident doubts about Italy, the requesting state, having prescriptive jurisdiction on the
basis of the ubiquity principle and the universality theory of jurisdiction.
263. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 116, art. 7, para. 2.
264. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on
Extradition, Strasbourg, 1985 (1st ed. 1969). The explanatory report is not a binding
instrument, but serves as one means of interpretation.
265. Id.
266. See Gesetz iiber die InternationaleRechtshilfe in Strafsachen, supra note 99,
at 112.
267. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
268. See Jescheck, Die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen in Europa, 66
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRc:HTswIssENscHAFT 518,

531-32 (1954). Jes-

check proposes to reduce the double criminality requirement to an ordrepublic requirement, which would be applicable only in cases when non-criminalization by the requested state is based upon some of that state's basic values. This is similar to a Basic
Rights clause. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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elements of the offense relating to the place of commission and the nationality of the wrongdoer or the victim would be considered as if they
had occurred in Germany.2" 9 The extraterritorial prescription, as
such,2 ' 0 is not relevant.27 1 Under the above-discussed national secrets hypothetical, the only relevant question is whether German law would apply if the secret had been a German national secret revealed to a foreign
power. The answer is clearly affirmative without express regard to the
so-called special use of double criminality.27 2 Note, however, that a
human rights clause would permit the requested state to deny extradition
if it believed that extradition would infringe upon basic human rights.
From a German point of view, allowing extradition does not violate or
interfere with Basic Rights even if the conduct supporting the extradition
request is prohibited only by the requesting state. From the standpoint of
German human rights, courts will bar extradition only if the requesting
state seeks extradition for conduct that could not be criminalized as such
in German law, or if the sanction provided in the requesting state's law
is one that violates German notions of legal sanctions. 273 United States

269. See Vogler, Walter & Wilkitzki, supra note 209, § 3 n.16.
270. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. The pertinent law is found in articles 1, 2, 8, and 10, of the German Penal Code.
271. See Mbrsberger, supra note 216 (discussing the question of whether German
authorities must check to determine whether the conduct is punishable under the law of
the requesting state). He proposes a reduced control. Practice of German Courts, however, does not reveal such control. See Eser & Lagodny, supra note 262. Extradition
might be refused, only if there is'an obvious error made by the requesting state, such as
when it is clear from the documents sent by the requesting state to support the extradition request that the facts do not come within the ambit of the law allegedly violated. But
even Mbrsberger, who insists that the requested state also have proscribed the relevant
type of conduct when done extraterritorially (i.e., the special use of double criminality)
when the alleged offense was committed in a third state, does not propose that the requested state check whether there is a genuine link with the requesting state.
272. For example, if extradition is sought for a robbery, German authorities would
determine only that robbery is proscribed by German substantive law, not whether Germany would expand the proscription to conduct in a third state such as Belgium. See
Vogler, Walter & Wilkitzki, supra note 209. Thus, if the facts of In re Stupp, supra
note 137, were to occur with Germany being the requested state, extradition would be
forthcoming. Another question is whether the German Penal Code would apply directly
to the offense committed in Belgium, i.e., the extraterritorial range group expanding the
substantive prescription of robbery to another state. If a German national committed
robbery in Belgium, this would cause concurrent or competing jurisdiction that could be
an obstacle to extradition, because the state that has the alleged perpetrator would want
to prosecute. See German Extradition Treaty, supra note 45, art. 8; European Convention on Extradition, supra note 116, art. 9.
273. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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law, on the other hand, requires that the offense be criminalized and
punishable with a minimal level of severity in both states. Constitutional
problems also may arise with eliminating the political offense exception.
Although the rule that a treaty must cover the extraditable conduct is not
constitutional in nature, United States jurisprudence consistently has required the coverage of extraditable conduct.
The concept and role of the special use of double criminality does not
play as important a role in German law and practice as it does in the
United States. This diminished role is attributable, perhaps, to the most
recent German approach in its extradition laws and treaties, which generally allows extradition only for offenses that are sufficiently grave,
with gravity determined on the basis of possible punishment.27 ' In some
older treaties, Germany, like the United States, explicitly enumerates extraditable offenses 275 but the more recent approach facilitates extradition
approval by no longer making it necessary to indicate the listed offense
and consider double criminality.
In addition to the United States tendency of establishing principles
slowly and inductively through judicial decisions, the United States view
and methodology is "to proceduralize." This is important to realize in
developing an understanding of United States jurisprudence and legal
analysis. In the United States context of protecting human rights in extradition, a major focal point is the debate over the extent to which the
judiciary ought to inquire into the treatment awaiting the individual in
the requesting state and also the extent to which the executive branch
ought to inquire into the human rights law in the requesting state. This
debate arises in the political offense setting276 and in the double crimi-

274. See European Convention on Extradition, supra note 116, art. 2, para. 1; German Treaty of Extradition with Yugoslavia, art. 2, para. 1, Nov. 26, 1970,
Bundesgesetzblatt 1974, part II, 1258; German Treaty of Extradition with Monaco, art.
2, para. 1, May 21, 1962, Bundesgesetzblatt 1964, part II, 1298; German Treaty of
Extradition with Portugal, art. 2, para. 1, June 15, 1964, Bundesgesetzblatt 1967, part
II, 2346, art. 2, para 1; German Treaty of Extradition with Tunisia, July 19, 1966,
Bundesgesetzblatt 1969, part II, 1158.
275. German Treaty of Extradition with Belgium, Jan. 17, 1958, Bundesgesetzblatt
1959, part II, 27; German Treaty of Extradition with the United States, June 20, 1978,
Bundesgesetzblatt 1980, part II, 647 (contains both the enumerative and the possible
penalty method of extraditable offenses), art. 2, para. 2, The Supplementary Treaty to
the Treaty of Extradition Between Germany and the United States, Oct. 21, 1986,
Bundesgesetzblatt 1988, part II, 1087 (ratified by Germany, not yet ratified by the
United States) (renders the list method non-applicable, because the elimination or possible penalty method predominates, and the appendix of listed offenses is deleted by article
1, para. (c) of the Supplementary Treaty).
276. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
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nality 2 " setting, as those aspects of extradition law have become the repositories of human and civil rights protection. From the German perspective, this is actually nothing more than a differentiation between
substantive and procedural law: the question concerning the situations
versus the executive is one of substantive law, whereas the role of the
judiciary is one of procedural law. Of course, from the United States
perspective, it is constitutional in nature.
German law provides mandatory judicial control in cases of possible
violations of personal rights.27 8 Every substantive legal position must be
reviewed by German courts, regardless of whether the judiciary has to
inquire into the conditions of another state."' The rationale behind the
German sequence of this analysis is that control through the judiciary
must serve the benefit of substantive rights and not vice versa; that is, the
scope of the substantive rights may not depend on the power of the judiciary. Perhaps this is a decisive point at which the European civil law
and common law views differ.
United States law proceduralizes substantive rights, because traditionally the judiciary is the constitutional check against encroachment by the
executive or legislative branches. 8 0 For example, the substantive fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure receives its sanction, or perhaps even its only effective recognition, in the
exclusionary rule. Evidence obtained in violation of this right is excluded
from trial. The weakness in this proceduralization is that when the
courts begin to lose power in relation to the other branches, or begin
believing that the substantive right needs to be diminished, the right is
substantively diminished by procedural means.281 Perhaps it is important

277. See supra notes 214-54 and accompanying text.
278. Art. 19, para. 4.
279. A classic example exists with regard to the substantive right to asylum. According to article 16, para. II, of the Basic Law, "[p]ersons persecuted on political grounds
shall enjoy the right of asylum." Judicial control in asylum cases means that not only the
executive branch, but also the judiciary has to analyze thoroughly the conditions in the
state of origin of the asylum-seeker. These problems are discussed in Note, supra note
210, at 322; see also M. WOLLENSCHLAGER & W. WEICKHARDT, 9 EZAR - ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMMLUNG ZUM AUSLANDER- UND ASYLRECHT 200-02 (looseleaf collection
of decisions).
280. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
281. Note the recent demise of the exclusionary rule, and erosion of what some feel
are constitutional protections. See, e.g., Special Issue: Response to the Truth in Criminal
Justice Series in, 23 MICH. J.L. REFORM (1990), which includes Kamisar, Remembering
the 'Old World' of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, at 537; Dripps,
Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, at 591; Tomkovicz, The Truth About Massiah, at
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to recognize that when a substantive right exists, effective procedural
means must be made available to enforce it. The United States system of
criminal procedure is adversarial, with the burdens of evidence production and proof resting on the prosecution. Significant obstacles to the
gathering of evidence have been developed to prevent the state from
abusing the criminal process and thereby eroding liberty. The Bill of
Rights was designed to limit the power of the federal government, and
its prohibitions, through the process of incorporation into the fourteenth
amendment, have since been made largely applicable to the states.
When Earl Warren was Chief Justice, three themes dominated the
decisionmaking of the United States Supreme Court: (1) ensure fair
treatment for rich and poor alike; (2) eliminate racial discrimination in
the criminal justice process; and (3) protect against unchecked power of
the executive branch. 282 It has long been true of the adversarial system

that the burdens of evidence production and of proof at trial resting on
the prosecutor and are not part of the judicial function. During the years
of the Warren Court, significant obstacles to evidence production were
enhanced to help ensure a fair trial, but also to protect against agglomeration of power in the executive, prosecutorial branch of government in
the name of "finding the truth."2 Properly understood, the aim was to
prevent the development of a police state. To achieve this, many of the
protections of the Bill of Rights have been applied to the states via the
fourteenth amendment's prohibition forbidding states to "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 2 8 '
The vision of criminal procedure as a mechanism to prevent the development of a police state gained its modern impetus when the judiciary
viewed with horror the depredations of the European dictatorships prior
to and during World War 11.285 These dictatorships, once installed,
641; Yackle, Form and Function in the Administration of Justice: The Bill of Rights
and Federal Habeas Corpus, at 685.
282. See Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law
Enforcement, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 11, 16-17 (1988).
283. See Special Issue: Response to the Truth in Criminal Justices Series in, 23
MICH. J.L. REFORM (1990); see also Damaka, Evidentiary Barriersto Conviction and
Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506
(1973).
284.

U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; LAFAVE &

ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

78-79

(1985).
285. Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 521-25 (noting that modem United States law of
constitutional criminal procedure began in 1932, with the decision in Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), decided within a few months of Hitler's rise to power in Germany).
Germany carefully has protected civil liberty and human rights for the same reason.
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taught graphic lessons in the uses of criminal "justice" institutions as
instrumentalities for the systematic destruction of political values upon
which free society rests.28 6 This reality was not lost on the Warren
Court, but seems to have been forgotten since, due perhaps to the significant insecurity and fear generated by the wide-spread perception that the
United States is tyrannized by crime and criminals and that public order
is collapsing.28 7
In 1968, when Herbert Packer wrote his significant work on the
United States criminal justice system, 288 United States society was in turmoil. Largely in reaction to police abuses, the Supreme Court spent
much effort reforming the criminal justice system to promote the civil
liberties of the United States people by making the Bill of Rights functional in the criminal justice arena. The impact on penal law and procedure was without parallel. In Packer's terms, the system was moving
from the "crime control" model towards an adversarial and judicial "due
process" model.2 19 Although oversimplified, Packer's vision of the United
States due process model is accurate in noting that it is based on notions
of confrontation and irreconcilable differences between the individual
and the state.29 0 This due process system has emphasized building safeguards against police abuse and the dangers of developing a police state,
even at the expense of fact-finding accuracy in a given case. The Court
developed and applied the rule to the states that if a police officer violated a suspect's constitutional protections and obtained evidence thereby
or as a result of that violation, 91 the evidence would be inadmissible.
Thus, even if all the parties in a given case knew that the accused com-

286. Allen, supra note 285, at 521-25.
287. Id.; see also RUDOVSKY, CRIMINAL JUSTIcE: THE ACcusED, IN OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS 203 (Dorsen ed. 1984).
288. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); Packer, The
Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY. & POLICE SCI.
238 (1966); Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
Although relied on by many scholars, some commentators have found Packer's models
oversimplified, unilluminating, and misleading. See, e.g., Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of CriminalProcedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72
GEO. L.J. 185, 209-28 (1983); Damaka, supra note 283, at 506; Genego, The New
Adversary, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 781, 842-56 (1988).
289. H. PACKER, supra note 288, at 149-73.
290. Blakesley & Curtis, United States: A Review of United States Supreme Court
Decisions Re CriminalJustice, 1984 Term, 9 COMP. L. Y.B. 95 (1985); Blakesley &
Curtis, Criminal Procedure in the United States, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (Clark & Ansay eds. 1991).
291. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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much
mitted the charged offense, the accused would be acquitted 292 if2too
93
of the evidence against the accused was tainted and unusable.
The due process model tolerates less efficiency to minimize police
power in an arena in which individuals are most vulnerable. Significantly, the Warren Court focused on the dangers of police and governmental abuse and on vindicating individual rights and failed to provide
effective solutions to the problems caused by the staggering increase in
crime.294 This ineffectiveness prompted some commentators to argue that
the United States should adopt some European models.29 5 Unfortunately,
recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a trend toward adoption of a
European model without the protections that have been built into the
European systems over the years.296 This retrenchment by the United
States Supreme Court has caused many state courts to interpret their
state constitutions more broadly and maintain the level of civil liberty
protection developed in the Warren Court. This phenomenon is known
as the "new federalism."29 7 States, through judicial decision, legislation,

292. See Simien, It Is a Constitution We Are Expounding, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 67 (1990); Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64
IND. L.J. 301 (1989); Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle:Reevaluating the Place of Truth
in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 799.
293. This can be contrasted with the European models in which there is increased
emphasis on finding the "objective truth." European criminal justice processes appear to
be built around the notion that penal law and punishment are not designed merely as
deterrents or mechanisms to facilitate retribution, but rather as mechanisms of education
and redemption. See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 439, 444-50 (1962); Griffiths,

Ideology in Criminal Procedureor a Third "Model" of the CriminalProcess, 79

YALE

L.J. 359 (1970); Damaka, supra note 283, at 560-75.
294. Allen, supra note 285, at 539.

295. Weigend, Continental Curesfor American Ailments: European Criminal Procedure as a Model for Law Reform, 2 CRIME & JUST. 381 (1980); Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure:A Pleafor Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO L.
REV. 361 (1977); Pugh, Ruminations Re Reform of American CriminalJustice (Espe-

cially Our Guilty Plea System: Reflections Derived From a Study of the French System,
36 LA. L. REV. 947 (1976); cf. J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
GERMANY (1977); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1977); Langbein & Weinreb,
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978).

296. Bottke, "Rule of Law" or "Due Process" as a Common Feature of Criminal
Process in Western Democratic Societies, 51 U. PrrT. L. REV. 419 (1990); Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court's decision makes sense if it
is developing an inquisatorial society); Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (majority decision leads to interrogations akin to the star chamber).
297. Dix, JudicialIndependence in Defining CriminalDefendants' Texas Constitutional Rights, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1369 (1990); Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State
Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141
(1985); see generally Devlin, State ConstitutionalAutonomy Rights in an Age of Fed-
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or constitutional provision certainly have the power to expand civil liberties.2 9 8 The power of state courts to act independently upon the new
federalism does not necessarily mean judicial activism for creation or expansion of civil liberties, although it might and often does.2 99 Thus,
"proceduralization" has significant constitutional, philosophical, and
substantive civil liberty content. It is important to recognize, however,
that in German constitutional law, when a substantive right exists, effective procedural means must be made available to enforce it.
B.

The Second Situation: When Two or More States Proscribe the
Given Conduct as Criminal and One State Enlarges this
Proscription

In practice, the circumstances described in the following hypothetical
are quite common. Suppose, for example, that an Austrian citizen killed
a German national while they both were in Austria. The offender could
be prosecuted and punished in either Austria or Germany. The territorial principle would grant jurisdiction in Austria, while the passive personality principle also would grant Germany jurisdiction. Here, the
problem is not whether the offender will be punished at all, but rather
which state will prosecute. Thus, this problem raises two essential questions. The first is whether the state where the offender committed the
prohibited conduct and was apprehended may keep or withhold the offender within its territory and refuse extradition to another interested
state. The second question involves the situation in which a fugitive is
convicted or acquitted in the state where the conduct occurred and voluntarily or involuntarily arrives in the territory of the second state.
1. Rights of the State Where the Offense Arose
It might be desirable to determine a hierarchy of accepted principles of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by claiming that jurisdiction based on territoriality prevails over active or passive personality. The consequences of
eral Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived from
FederalSources, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 195 (1990); Collins & Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicial Review: 1985 Survey of State ConstitutionalIndividual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 325 (1986); Williams, In the Supreme
Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result,
35 S.C.L. REV. 353 (1984); Developments in the Law, The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1329 (1982) ("state bills of rights may once
again assume a prominent role").
298. Dix, supra note 297, at. 1369-70.
299. Id. at 1370.
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such a hierarchy would be that a state having only the personality principle always would be secondary to the state on whose territory the offense occurred. The state with secondary jurisdiction could not obtain
extradition from the state with primary jurisdiction unless the latter did
not wish to prosecute. Aside from the problem that international law
provides a duty to extradite only on the basis of a treaty,3 00 commentators have argued for such a hierarchy of jurisdictional principles.3 01 The
viability of this approach, however, is questionable and raises interesting
international legal problems. The sense of the hierarchy must be derived
from customary international law, which provides that jurisdiction is appropriate and may be asserted as long as there is a genuine link
(sinnvoller Anknpfungspunkt) between the conduct and the state asserting jurisdiction.30 2 The rule requiring a genuine link concerns the relation between rule international law and national law, 0 3 but the customary international law rule arose because the national law of the various
states required that the genuine link exist. Therefore, if customary international law merely requires a link between the conduct and the asserting state, it is possible that it also could not contain a hierarchy of principles derived from customary international law.
Although the rule requiring a genuine link arose as a rule of customary international law, since the rule came into existence, the states of the
world can no longer exercise prescriptive jurisdiction at whim. Consequently, it becomes impossible under international law to prescribe acts
committed extraterritorially without such a link. As a result, the concept
of "territoriality" is interpreted from the viewpoint of international law
rather than national law. For example, a state cannot legally assert territorial prescriptive jurisdiction simply because its national law provides a
sufficient territorial link.
Under international law, however, a very difficult question must be

300. See infra notes 305-11 and accompanying text. Further, a duty to extradite in
cases of concurring jurisdiction may be created only by such a treaty on the level of
international treaty law.
301. See, e.g., Feller, Concurrent Criminal Jurisdiction in the International
Sphere, 16 ISRAEL L. REv. 40, 68 (1981); Schultz, Neuere Entwicklungen im
sogenannten internationalen Strafrecht, in FzsTsCHRiFr FuER HELLMUTH VON
WEBER ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 305, 310 (Welzel, Conrad, Kaufmann, & Kaufmann eds.
1968); Vogler, Entwicklungstendenzen im internationalenstrafrecht unter Berficksichtigung der Konventionen des Europarats,in FsTscImIFrT FUER REINHART MAURACH
zuM 70. GEBURSTSTAG AM 24. AUGUST 1989 895-906 (Jescheck & Vogler eds. 1989);
C. BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
302. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
303. See Lagodny, supra note 169, at 1005.
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addressed. Whether different approaches to what constitutes a genuine
link in different areas or branches of law (e.g., antitrust, environmental
protection, criminal law) must be unified or, because each branch or area
of law has different policies and justifications for expanding or not expanding extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, the approaches can remain separate.3 0 4 Customary international law possibly has developed a
hierarchy in bases of jurisdiction or genuine links acceptable under current international law, but logic suggests the opposite. A rule of international law appears to exist that a state not exercise prescriptive jurisdiction unless there is a genuine link as a conditional requirement. Either
there is a genuine link or there is not, a determination made by international law rather than national law. The genuine link is a criterion for
"a) or "non-a." The same criterion that separates "a" and "non-a" cannot be a criterion for "more-a" and "less-a." Certainly, there might be
other criteria for the proposition of hierarchy, but the genuine link criterion itself cannot be used. This is similar to the field of mathematics,
which differentiates between notwendiger and hinreichender Bedingung, roughly translated as "necessary condition" and "sufficient condition." The genuine link is a necessary condition, thus it cannot be a
sufficient condition as well. To find other criteria will involve at least an
interpretation of the above-mentioned other branches of extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction, such as antitrust, and environmental law. This
is a very difficult question, but is one that must be addressed.
2.

Withholding the Offender

A solution to the question of "withholding" the offender is found at
the level of international treaty law. If the first state has not yet terminated proceedings against the offender or isd.eciding whether to initiate
proceedings, one may argue about the principle aut dedere aut prosequi
(either extradite or prosecute). This solution raises several questions, including whether the requested state has the choice of extraditing or prosecuting or whether international law establishes a priority for extradition. It also raises the question of whether the maxim really should be
primo dedere secondo prosequ (first extradite, second prosecute). The
answers are found in international extradition treaties, treaties on international cooperation in criminal matters, and certain treaties prohibiting
specific conduct, such as those relating to hostage-taking and hijacking.

304. See Wildhaber, Jurisdiktionsgrundsatzeund Jurisdiktionsgrenzen im V*6lkerrecht, 61 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES REcHT, 99, 104 (1985).
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The European Convention on Extradition of 1957,05 however, does not
contains a general rule.308 While the very important conventions relating
to aircraft hijacking10 7 and offenses against diplomats 8 ' provide a choice
either to extradite or prosecute,3 08 they do not establish priority for either.31 0 In the absence of treaties, no rule of priority or choice on the
level of international law exists, especially since not even customary rules
of international law require extradition. 1
2.

Rights of the Offender

The question of whether an offender can be convicted twice (once in
each state) for the same conduct, is answered primarily on the basis of
international treaties, as there is no rule of customary international law
prohibiting double conviction. 1 2 Article 9 of the European Convention
on Extradition of 1975 provides that
[e]xtradition shall not be granted if final judgment has been passed by the
competent authorities of the requested Party upon the person claimed in
respect of the offence or offences for which extradition is requested. Extradition may be refused if the competent authorities of the requested Party
have decided either not to institute or to terminate proceedings in respect
3 13
of the same offence or offences.

305. Europ. T.S. No. 24.
306. If extradition of nationals is refused, the requested state "shall at the request of
the requesting party submit the case to its competent authorities in order that proceedings may be taken if they are considered appropriate." European Convention on Extradition, supra note 116, art. 6, para. 2. See art. 7, para. 3 of the Treaty Between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Extradition, 32 U.S.T. 1485;
T.I.A.S. No. 9785 (entered into force, Aug. 29, 1980).
307. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The
Hague, Dec. 16, 1970), 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; The Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, Dec. 23,
1971), 24 U.S.T. 568, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
308. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York, Dec. 14, 1973), 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
309. See art. 7, of the Hague, supra note 307, the Montreal, supra note 307, and
the New York Conventions, supra note 308.
310. For discussion of this problem in the Case of Hamadei, see Kennedy, Stein &
Rubin, The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 5 (1990).
311. See I. SHEARER, supra note 35, at 23-27; C. BLAxEsLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
312. See 75 DEcisioNs OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUrIONAL COURT 1-34 (1988)
(analysis of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany);
BLAKESLEY, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
313. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 116, art. 9; see also German
Extradition Treaty, supra note 45, arts. 8, 10.
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These stipulations are obstacles to a second conviction in the requesting state, but they do not govern when there is a question of the extraditee being convicted in a third state814 or whether the sanction of the
third state judgment must be taken into account when the extraditee is
sentenced again. Therefore, parties must take all necessary steps to assure that the principle of ne bis in idem (not twice in the same thing) 15
also be applied to convictions for the same offense in other states and not
be applied only to convictions of one state.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Considering the underlying reasons for the multiplicity of states having jurisdiction for the same conduct and the interstate and individual
problems arising out of this concurrence, one must consider a reduction
of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the national level. If the only bases of
jurisdiction are a strict principle of territoriality without extensions by
ubiquity and the protective principle, 16 competing, concurrent jurisdiction will not pose a problem. When the active and passive personality
principles are addressed along with the universality principle, more significant problems of competing jurisdiction will arise.
Perhaps it would be wise to apply the latter three principles only if
extradition to the state in which the crime actually took place were not
possible, either for legal or factual reasons. This would necessitate integrating 317 the principle of vicarious administration of justice 8 ' into the
principles of active and passive personality and universality. 9 Conse314. The Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (15 Oct.
1975), Europ. T.S. No. 86, however, excludes extradition if the offender has been convicted in a third state that is a party to the Convention.
315. This is the latin maxim for protection against double jeopardy.
316. This is not the case when a second state protects the interests of a foreign state

to which the fugitive is closely linked.
317. In Germany, the application of the principle of vicarious administration of justice does not require a genuine link to be established by the other bases of jurisdiction
(active or passive personality; universality), because it is regarded as a genuine link in its
own right. See Meyer, supra note 8, at 109, 116 (the other principles or bases have
priority only if they are applicable; vicarious administration of justice applies only if
none of the others is applicable).
318. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text; Meyer, supra note 8.
319. The European view of the universality principle creates a "genuine link" for a
given state to create extraterritorial jurisdiction based on international treaties that, for
the most part, oblige each member state to do so. The principle of vicarious administration of justice is independent of these treaties and refers to the fact that extradition is not
feasible under a given set of circumstances. Therefore, it is restricted to cases in which
the state wherein the crime has been committed desires the fugitive to be extradited, but
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quently, these principles would apply only if extradition to the state
where the crime has been committed is neither possible nor feasible, even
though the requesting state wishes to prosecute. In other words, the duty
of primo dedere secundo prosequi (first extradite, second prosecute)
would not be a duty under international law, but rather a rule of national law only.3 20 This proposal may run counter to the tendency to
"throw a net" of several national criminal jurisdictions over an alleged
offender to ensure that the offender will not go free. Nevertheless, adoption of these proposals would eliminate some of the confusion surrounding these concerns by enhancing international extradition relations and
cooperation. These proposals allow the active and passive personality
and the universality principles to maintain importance and have an impact, even if extradition is not possible because of differences in national
jurisdictional law. It is absolutely essential to promulgate an international treaty that promotes the general acceptance of ne bis in idem (for
the same conduct) and avoids multiple convictions in two or more
states. 2 ' At the very least, rather than simply expanding jurisdiction and
multiplying the problem of competing jurisdiction, more thought ought
to be applied to improving international cooperation in criminal matters.

the request has been or will be denied. A request for extradition also implicitly includes
the indication that the requesting state is of the opinion that the act is punishable under
its law. This prevents the requested state (the one asked to extradite, but refuses, choosing to prosecute) from punishing more acts than the "represented" state (the one that
requested extradition and for whom the prosecution is done) really intends to punish. See
D. OEHLER, supra note 35, at 811, 818; Lagodny, supra note 169, at 992.
320. See Harvard Draft (Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime), art. 10, para. a, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 573 (1935).
321. The European Community has taken a step in this direction with the promulgation of the Convention Between the Member States of the European Communities on
Double Jeopardy, opened for signatureMay 25, 1987 (not yet entered into force). Article 1 provides: "A person whose trial has finally been disposed of in a Member State
may not be prosecuted in another Member State in respect of the same facts, provided
that if a sanction was imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being
enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing state." Article 2
provides for the possibility of reservations, if the underlying facts partly or totally occur
in the territory of the second state, if the offense was directed against the security or
other essential interests of the second state or if it was committed by an official of the
second member state contrary to the duties of his office. In case of such reservations,
article 3 provides that if a member state brings a further prosecution in respect of the
same facts against a person whose trial finally has been disposed of in another member
state, any period of deprivation of liberty served in the latter member state arising from
those facts shall be deducted from any sanction imposed.

